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PRE?ACE

This study of the reconstruction era of American history is
based primarily upon editorials from the leading newspapers
published during that period. out of the multitude of facts
which may be considered within the domain of reconstruction
time, those have been selected which seem best fitted to ex1
1

plain the more outstanding political, constitutional and legislative developments. The editorials necessarily follow a
natural chronological sequence as the national events developed
from day to day. Therefore, events have been grouped into five
chapters according to chronological order. An attempt has
been made to give proper unity to the entire study and also to
stress Negro Suffrage, Radical politics, and the leading issues
which ultimately changed the course of American History.
It is admitted that sectionalism and political color found
their way into the editorial pages, but in answer to this the
reader is reminded by one writer that " the periodical press
still remains the most important single source the historian
has at his command for the reconstruction of the life of the
1

past three centuries". James Ford Rhodes has a well known history of the reconstruction era, and his opinion regarding evidence is of value to us here. He writes,"take the newspaper for
what it is, a hasty gatherer of facts, a hurried commentator
on the same, and it may well constitute a part of historical
1. Lucy Maynard Salmon, The Newspaper and the Historian,
oxtord, 1923,p. 491.

2

evidenoe".
In this study, newspaper material constitutes the fundamental part of the historical evidence. However, this has been
balanced by the use of two standard historical texts, those by
Oberholtzer and Rhodes, and use has been made of general secondary works, reminiscences, biographies 811ld a small amount of
manuscript source material. A combination of these sources results in a view both of public opinion and individual ideas.
The idea throughout has been to seoure views froa both sides,
and in the absence of very much Southern material, it has been
necessary to use a considerable amount of Northern Democratic
opinion. The Northern papers have been selected from a group of
cities in different states with the hope that a comprehensive
view might be obtained.
In a work like this i t is impossible to evaluate material
properly without recognizing some of the leading personalities
oonneoted with the writing. Editorial writing reached its elimax in Ameriaa during this era under the guidanoe of suoh writers as E. L. Godkin, George William Curtis, Horace Greeley,
Henry Raymond, and others included in our study.

1~.

Oswald

Villard of The Nation remarks,"we have a steady waning of individualism in the daily periodical, marked first by the disappearanae of the great editor'iihose personality formerly
2. James Ford Rhodes, "The Newspac,r. as Historical Sourcesr
Atlantio Monthlz,
y,19o9. p. 65o.

3

shown through its pages". There can be no doubt that these men
exerted great influence during their time and for this reason
their opinions are of value in reconstructing the story of
national events from 1864 to 1868. Both Oberholtzer and Rhodes
have used considerable periodical material from these writers
in their standard volumes on reconstruction. Concerning them
Frederic L. Paxson has stated, "Their differences in point of
view are wide, but between them they cover most of the impor4,

tant facts".
American history developed rapidly after Civil War days into
what F. L. Paxson oalls"the New Nation". It has been the aim
of this study to show some of the movements which lead to the
change. Probably no other period shows the absurd lengths to
which our two-party system may be carried,9r the possible disaster for our nation in depending upon political organization
such as now exists. Even the Constitutional basis of the executive, legislative and Judicial departments was seriously
endangered during Johnson's time. Andrew Johnson ie presented
here as one of the leaders, and no attempt has been made
either to justify or condemn his part in national events. When
his aame was forgotten following the impeachment trial, all
attention was turned to the Democratic Convention in New York
City. America was now facing'' new era.
3. Oswald G. Villard, The Press Today, New York, 1930, p. 47.
4. F.L. Paxson, Recent History o? the United States,
New York, 1921~ p. 19.
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seventeenth President rose to power through the success

of one assassin and the failure of another. Booth removed Lincoln, while his accomplice, Atzerodt, failed to eliminate
Johnson, and the result was a Tennessee Democrat elected on a
Union Party ticket, attempting to deal with a Republican Congress. If the immediate cause of his accession was assassination, then a more remote and significant one is the Baltimore
Convention held on June 7, 1864, where the Republican Party
made an effort to unite antagonistic sections to save an election.
Lincoln realized that a Union sentiment required a Union
Party, and to complete this idea he sent General Daniel Sickles to investigate the war record of Andrew Johnson with the
1

idea of placing him on the ticket if acceptable. Although it
is obvious that a Tennessee candidate would probably have been
an advantage, yet from the standpoint of polities there was
another very real reason why Johnson was finally nominated.
The fundamental motive at this point was the removal of William H. Sewazd from the cabinet to make way for Daniel

s.

Dick-

inson. The New York delegation brought about Johnson's nomina2

tion at Baltimore to save
1. Robert

w.

Se~4.

This defeated •Sumner of

Winston, Andrew Johnson, Plebeian and Patriot,
lew York, 1928, p. 254.
2. ............
Ibid., P• 256 •

.. 23

Massachusetts whose intention it was to oust Seward, and may
be looked upon as a definite basis of antagonism between Johnson and Sumner when the two clashed later.
Loyal Republican journals of 1864 emphasize the lack of wisdom in changing during a crisis, and a universal belief in the
capacity of

A~raham

Lincoln. !he Washington Chronicle said,

"lhe Presidency came to him by a apeoial Jrovidence, and he
4

has moved in the right path from the beginning"; and again,
"He

has

shown the devotion of washington and the energy of

5

Jackson". General opinion in the North acclaimed him"as a man
in the chair more universally acceptable by all odds, than

~

6

could hope to elect from without", and tended to believe that
7

"God meant Lincoln for President or the nation is deceive4".

Democratic opinion varied from this idea in maintaining that
"it was not even necessary to hold a Convention, for Mr. Lincoln had long since re-nominated himself. Now that he has ao8

cepted, the farce of his nomination ends". Even though the
stress of war days was sufficient to elicit some degree of
united action, it was not powerful enough to remove sectionalism, and the Democrats saw little hope in placing their confi3. George F. Milton, The tfe of Hate, New York, 1930, p. 37.

4. The Washington Chronic e, Jan. 2, 1864. Washington D.C.
5. !bid., Jan. 2, 1864.
6. ~ChiC!§O Daily Tribune, Jan. 5, 1864. Chicago, Illinios.
7.

8.

Ibid.

~Chicago

Times, May 2, 1864. Chicago, Illinois.
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dence in a new administration because it included a Tennessee
candidate.
It was a very natural and necessary thing that the u.nton
should be emphasized in this campaign. Harpers Weeklz said,"If
M%. Lincoln is re-elected, the union, the authority of the gov-

ernment, and the na-tional honor will be maintained uneondition9

ally". It must not be

assumed:~

that Lincoln carried the ticket

through in 1864 with overwhelming influence, and that Johnson
merely rode to victory on the strength of the President's popular! ty.
A later historian has written, "There were many men in 1864
who believe4 that the war was a mistake, and that Lincoln was
..

10

a failure." In the ultimate preservation of the Union, Johnson
was the man who felt the effects of this 4issatisfaotion. Since
the days when the Constitution was made, sectionalism had manifested itself perhaps stronger in New England than in any other
part of the United States. The same political expediency which
would secure New England support for a Tennessee Democrat as
Viae-President would likewise make him unacceptable as a President.
Without moralizing regarding slavery,it is impossible to
disregard this side of the question, since it was emphasized
9. Harpers Weekly, Sept. 10,1864. New York.
10. Frederic L. Paxson, The New Nation,
camo~!dge Massachusetts, 1919, p.3.

particularly in New England by such speakers as Henry Ward
Beecher, Edward Everett Hale, and the more radical Wendell
Phillips. Some writers maintained it to be "no moral issue at
all that impelled our government to take up arms. The only
question was a civil one. War sprung alone from a civil nell
oessity of maintaining constitutional authority~ The South
was equally conscious of a letter sent to the Governor of
Kentucky in which Lincoln had stated: " I am naturall7

ant~

slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I cannot
12
remember when I did not so think and feelt' Then if " the reb.els went to war in order to win an unfettered and unlimited
13

richt of extending slavery"

it is obvious that the Northern

moralists could make a big issue out ot this. In a republican
form of government these issues reached·their climax in the
activities of the people's representatives. Meanwhile, the
work of 1864 is more concerned with the two leaders of the
nation than with Senators and Representatives.
Prior to the nomination, a journal in Lexington, KentuGky,
made the remark that " Mr. Lincoln will be nominated without
opposition, while Hannibal Hamlin is the most likely candidate
14

for Vice-President. The leas!_likely would be Andrew Johnsont'
11. The New York TimesT December 6, 1864, New York City.
12. The Chicago Dailir ribune, April 20, 1864.
13. The Washinfton c onicle, April 21, 1864.
14. Tlie Lexlng on observer and Reporter, June 8, 1864,
Lexington, Kentucky.

I

-~-

Even lhe Chicaco Daily Tribune,later to be such an enemy of
the Vice-President, admittet that " he{Johnson) has inherited
traits

good characte%, an unusual strength of native talen
15
sound common sense, indomitable courage and honesty~ MZ. L1no~

ooln gave more reasons in a letter written March 26, 1863,why,
"few men in Congress have exerted in the beginnin& of the war
so decided an influence •pon public opinion in the North as
did Mr. Johnson. His oonduot as military governor of Tennessee
in no way diminished his popularity, and won him ardent admir16.

era in every loyal State".

In 18il Johnson had been recognized as a Democrat, an4 as
a s•pporter of all the leading measures of the Democratic Party. In 1860 he had favored the nomination of Breckenridge and
Lane and had given his support to that ultra-Democratic ticke
This was not a point to stress in 1864, but it was one to explain. A Washi~ton paper answered it by saying, " .Andrew
Johnson supported Breckenridge for President in 1860 in the
honest belief that he was speaking the wishes of his oonstit17

uentsf Perhaps this was a good political statement making
the effort to emphasize Johnson's loyalty, but it was not
enough to satisfy later opponents who claimed him to be a
traitor to bis party.
15. The Chicaio Dailf ~ribune, July 9,1864.
lodar=ai, tlnooln's Plan of Reconstruction,
16. char!es

n.

lew York, 1961, p.
17. The Washington Chronicle, June 16, 1864.

33.

!he first signs of reconstruction had already appeared
upon the horizon when

Char~es

sumner advanced his idea that

the rebel states had ceased to exist. Reverdy Johnson of Maryland struck a salient point when he remarked that n this makes
18
lehnson an alien enemy~. This idea did not become prevalent
until after the election was over but it is significant to
see its oriein here in 1864 and late• watch it develop into a
severe strucgle between President and Congress.
Southern opinion at times went so far as to maintain that
the Vice-Presidential candidate was a traitor to his party
and

guilty of apostaoy. The Lexington Observer and Reporter

said, "Of all the men named, we should have preferred Johnson
as Vice-Presidential nominee. Odious to the true union men of
his own party and state, enjoyine neither confidence nor re19

spect, he will prejudice even the nominee for President". The
heat of war time tended to give Johnson, as a former military
governor, additional political prestige despite this argument,
and

of course the absence of southern voting was likewise

essential.
Reconstruction was sufficiently developed as a plan to
have it broucht into the campaign of 1864. The Chicago Times
11. Ibid., June 21, 1864.
19. The texi!§ton Observer and Reporter, June ll, 1864.

believed " Mr. Lincoln's plan of reconstruction is fairly
illustrated by the appointment

o~

delegates to the Baltimore

Convention from South Carolina. The next step will be to have
the same people who elected them vote for Presidential electors for South Carolina. It is by this means that MZ. Lincoln
20
proposes to re-elect himselfw. Of course such interpretations
could be expected from a Democratic paper during an election,
but the above statement is a aic,n of the times and is only
one phase of irritation and opposition to Lincoln's ideas on
reconstruction.
Hearkening back to the days of Jefferson, fhe New York
Tribune hit upon the " majority-rule" idea and made " acquiescence in the decision of a majority the vital principle of

n

Republics".

Mr. Lincoln's idea of " one-tenth" was thus

struck boldly in a way that could easily create unnecessary
prejudice by adhering to maxims at the expense of human necessity during a crisis. One of the chief objections then in the
North was based on the ground that it is violative of the
principle laid down in organic law to follow the Lincoln plan;
22
that above all, ~jorities shall rule". Next in the line of
criticism came a hint of Congressional power in the process.
The opposition to Johnson seemed quite eager to show that he
20. !he Chic!fo Times, May 31, 1864.
21. The lew ~rk tribune, November 19,1864.
22. The 'ashlncton chionicle, U&zch 12, 1864.

was bzeakinc the fundamental eonstitutional principles of our
government, and this argument soon became a political neoessit
in building up Congressional

powe~.

It was feared that the rebel states would be

of

~elieved

military rule too soon and returned to their old position in
the Union. To avoid such a eontingency it was declared that
"neither the President nor Congress, singly, can do the work
to suoh restoration. There must be conJoint action
23
between the President and COD&'ress". The Atlantic Monthll

neoessa~y

advocated a plan

fo~

taking care ot the South by sending

" armies of freemen into that area to secure the necessar1
24
one-tenth vote". Then follows a long explanation concerning a
total lack of the desire for venCeance on the part of the
North except perhaps as was necessary in a few individual
oases. Men of considerable influence in

thei~

day and who were

writing, speaking, and helping to form public opinion, became
possessed of the idea of a Northern
Hale thought the

histo~y

C~usade.

Edward Everett

of all times definitely

p~oves

that

" Northern invasions, when aucoesstul, advance the civiliza25
tion of the world". Puritanism gave vent to the Biblical
plan and hoped the North would " do in the South what Abraham

-'

23. ~he New Yo~k Times July 11, 1864.
24. The lt!antlo Montify, Feb~uary, 1864.
25. Ibll.
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26
did in Canaan". After a time, Western papers followed in the
same type of crusade against the South, and it is difficult to
see anything but grim determination to demand an absolute
change in social, political and economic life.
New England sermons may quite fairly be represented by the
activities of Henry ward Beeoher. On November 14, 1864, 1<1:r.
Beecher advocated an idea which was to bear fruit later. He
said, " Europe is made up of conquered provinces, whose people
are contented and whose place in the world is still a powerful
27
one". In the hands of !haddeus Stevens this plan for reconstructing the southern states became so powerful as to hinder
any kind or sympathetic attitude. But Mr. Beecher concluded

that there was a cheerful future despite present submissions
and that in ten years the South would have nothinc to complain
88

of and " would celebrate the destruction of slavery".

The campaign of 1864 accentuated the feeling of plebeian
versus aristocrat and glorified an Illinois rail splitter with
his colleague, a Tennessee tailar, over against an aristocratic South. Evidently the predominance of Southern men before

th~

war was quite prominent in many minds of the North, and charts
were printed in papers there to show how many offices this
26. Ibid.
27. The lew York Tribune, November 14, 1864.
28.

-!bid.

-10-

section had held in the old days. " The chairman of almost
every important committee of both House and Senate had former29

ly been a Southern slaveholder",

and the most complete power

is shown in suoh offices as Speaker of the Rouse, Secretary
of State and Supreme Court Justices. " But henceforth the Free
30

States will guide the destinies of this Republic".

More licht may be thrown on the attitude towards the South
by realizing the underlying hatred of some Southern institutions. The Washington Chronicle maintained that, "it is too
late in the day to repeat the stereotyped gasconade of invul31

nerable and invincible Southern chivalry".

The Chic!io Daill

Tribune remarked that, " Where there is an aristocracy established3~y

class".

law it is necessary there should also be an inferior

An

example of the intermixture of slavery, sectional-

ism and hatred may be clearly shown in statements from ...........
fhe
Chicago Daily Tribune. "If it were not for the corrupting
influence of slaver7, the people of the South as well as those
of the North would all be swa7ed by a noble sentiment of union
33

as one people".

A few days later this same noble sentiment of

union gave expression to a new fee•ing which revealed the idea
29. The washipgton Chronicle. January 2, 1864.
30. Ibid.
31. !h14., April 1, 1864.
32. The Ohic:fo Dail~ Tribune, January l, 1864.
33. tb14., Fe ruary , 1864.

-111

that the " South acts fzom feeling and the Nozth from principle, hence the South is often eager and rash. When

t~e

south-

erner is whipped he is accustomed to giving up; so he will now
34
Let the government make its calculations and act accordingly".
Reconciliation is a wonderful thing, but it is difficult to
see how a genuine Southerner could take open insult, lose his
self-respect and still receive Northern plans of reconstruc•tion freely and successfully.
Accozding to the press, the mass of men in the North favored Lincoln. " We have a man at the helm in whom the masses
repose great faith. The country has a certainty in Abraham
35
Lincoln for he has been ~ried and proven to be pure gold".
Harpers Weekly . held up his personal character as the " rook
upon which the opposition is wreokedr and believed the " profound confidence of the great mass of the people was still un36
brokeh". The accentuation of plebeian principles and the heat
of civil war were both highly conducive to this attitude and
one wonders what the opinion concerning Johnson was as public
favor rose for Lincoln. One significant idea expressed before
the election shows this quite well and is in itself a prophecy
of events to coae. " If Mr. Lincoln be re-elected, and by his
decease M%. Johnson should become President, there would be as
34. Ibid., February 11,1864.
35. !Dtl., February 27,1864.
36. Harpers Weekly October 15, 1864.

true and tried a Union man in the chair as if the President
37
had lived". Political power was working too muQh at this time
to really allow very many papers to print editorials against
the President.

war

conditions explain part of this, and there-

fore it is fairly certain that the mass of people were ready
to support the administration.
However this same mass of people inevitably came to the
place where it was

necessar~

to send representatives to Con-

gress and at that point an opportunity for trouble arose.
First of all, the primary system threw power into the hands of
political leaders who could plan affairs far in advance of
public opinion. Secondly, it was recognized and admitted that
the primary system was the real cause for sending inferior
men to represent the people. !he New York Tribune said, " It
is a solemn fact that we do not send so able men to Congress
as we did some forty to sixty years ago; our detestable sys38

tem of primary meetings and nominations are the main cause".
While there need be no discussion here as to the relative

merits and power of the legislative and executive branches of
our government, it is at least essential that Congress shall
not be looked upon as a panacea for national ills durinl
times of stress when direct action is needed. But already
37. Ibid., October 8, 1864.
38. !he New York Tribune, July i, 1864.
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manY were advocating that Presidential action be not too
speedy, because Con&ress must be looked to if a substantial
39
agreement was to be reached.
Negro suffrage makes its first appearance as a possible
issue in the early part of January, 1864, and the opinion was
voiced by the ardent sponsor of this campaign in later days,
The Chicago Daily Tribune. " The black people are working into
the raaks of recognized humanity and are without a doubt to
40
take care of themselves as if their skins were white". Four
million freedmen offered almost unlimited opportunities for
political development so it is little wonder that national
needs were held in abeyance while exploitation was carefully
planned.
No time was wasted in starting criticism of the war administration after the first hope of peace arose. Some claimed
the Northern people had formed erroneous

~udgments

from the

very beginning. For example, Lincoln had called for seventyfive thousand men to start a campaign against a territory one41
half as large as the whole of Europe. In 1863 a day of
thanksgiving was held in commemoration of the " flnal and
39.The New York Times, July 11, 1864.
40.Tlie dliicago Dilly Tribune, January 5, 1864.
4l.The chicago Times, February 18, 1864.

permanent deliverance of East Tennessee, while exactly two
months later General Longstreet was in possession of the same
42

territory".

Democratic Journals looked upon the President as
43

" A second Washington and a smutty joker", or a " blundering
44

intermeddler in the affairs of the army".

It was said of

General Grant that he had three opponents durin£ the campaign
of Richmond;" The rebel army, New York press and a President45

hunting administration". Rebel and Copperhead opinion thus
rose quite high in the campaign of 1864 even in parts of the
:North.
Cabinet proceedings were certainly not entirely harmonious
during 1864 if general indications from the press can be relied upon. Southern opinion declared Stanton and Halleck to be
46

"an incubus upon the management of military matters", and
47

looked upon them both as "notoriously unfitted" for their
offices. But true to the "Old Jeffersonian doctrine, few men
4S

die and none resign while holding office". The New York Times
thought it " very likely" that w some changes in the cabinet
would conduce to the good of the country", but did not think
42. Ibid.
43. Ibi(., Februart 25, 1864.
44. tbld •• Ka7 8, 18i4.
45. !he Lexiyton Observer and Reporter, July 23, 1864.
ii. onn
17. Ibid.
!~:
York 'l!1mes, AU8Ust 11, 1864.

Qi!iew

-15-

it was wise at all to begin with the
the year when
same

turthe~

war

Department. Later in

agitation created more discussion the

the President nor the coun50
try would assent to Stanton leaving office". There was onl7
pape~

remarked that

"neithe~

one way !or the country to express its opinion in an authoritative manner and that was by its representatives. Since the
president is himself a representative of the people then the
question arises as to what would happen if he disagreed with
congress 1n re.ard to cabinet officers. This question is more
tully developed in 1865.
People were looking to Congress for " calmness, decision
51
and precision in the legislation of the winter of l864f
Some thouaht that the new administration would even win South52

ern opinion and induce a return to " Constitutional Rule". It
is quite significant to note the idea that if the election
depended upon the conduct of the war there would be a large
measure of doubt as to iis outcome. Already the aftermath of
Union Party activities became apparent as each side attempted
to regain its status in time

fo~

Congressional elections.

The year 1864 marks a general beginning of movements whose
power was not completed until a few years later. It is quite
doubtful as to whether Lincoln's war administration would
50. The New York Times, November 18, 1864.
51. Maipers Week!~, December 17, 1864.
52. The lew York imes, November 18, 1864.

-161

have made him very popular
tivated to think

a~ter

different!~.

public opinion had been cul-

Criticism was growing stronger

as 1865 approached. Although most people were apparently still
in support of the administration, yet it is certain that there
was an undercurrent of adverse opinion which was determined
to be recognized when opportunity arose.

-1:7-

CHAPrER II
Lincoln's Civil War administration has been characterize4
1

as a " Presidential Dictatorship•, although in using such
power he is said to have shown " a better combination of
temperament, conviction, and ability to grapple with a complication like that in which this country was involved than any
2

man in the history of our nation". Whatever forces were working against him had as yet failed to shake the confidence of
the people. Time has given present day views of this situation
a better perspective and has opened the memoirs of men who
were not in

favo~

of Lincoln. After all, perhaps the press

leads us to see the nationalist view or 'the people' too much
as an aggregate. When the problem of reconstruction oame up
for final solution the man who inherited Lincoln's cabinet
ant\ who followed his plan found to his regret that 'the people
meant very little in comparison with a rather small group of
legislators.
George

w.

Julian of Indiana belonged to that group, and Mr.

Julian at least gives us an indication of the trend of feeling which was to be characteristic of the Radicals." Of the

more earnest and thorough-going Republicans in Congress
probably not one in ten

favore~inooln,

and

"during the

l.William A. Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruct
ion, New fo~k, 1898, p. 14.
2. Harpers weekly, February 25, 18o5.

-18month of June, 1864, the feeling beeame more and more bitter
and intense against Mr. Linooln, although its expression
3

never found its WJJ.y to the people". :M:r. Julian there tore olearly states the fact that this group feeling was quite powerful
long before Johnson's aoceseion, and secondly, that it was not
in the minds of the general public. George F. Milton adds that
"Sumner, Chase, Butler, Wade, Tremont, and Davis sought

deeper~

ately to pre.an1 Lincoln's renomination", while the pocket
4

veto of the Wade-Davis bill increased their wrath. The Chicago
Daill Tribune believed that

~e ~uld

have more influence over

the administration during the next four years than he has had
5

during the past". Whatever hatred had arisn, it was admitted
by those who were not among his admirers and who believed "a
stronger man oould have been selected for President" that "his
6

death now would be a calamity". This statement was made in
Maroh, 1865, and shows a lurking fear whieh tended to hole
support for Lincoln until the orisis was over.
Andrew Johnson was inaugurated on the mbrning of April 15,
and "was at once surrounded by radieal and conservative poli7

ticians". Julian says there was a political caucus most of
3. George

w.

Julian, Political Recollections, Chicago, 1884.
p. 243.

4. Milton, p. 168.
5. The Chio~o Dailt Tribune, April 14, 1865.
6. The New ork Trl une, Mirch 17, 1865.

7.Ju!1an, p. 255.

-19the afternoon, "held for the purpose of considering the necessity of a new cabinet and a line of policy less conciliatory
8

than that ot Mr. Lincoln". "And while everybody was shocked at
Lincoln's murder, the feeling was nearly universal that the
9

accession of Johnson would prove a Godsend to the country". He
concludes this radical outburst by declaring the reconstruction policies of Lincoln to be "as distasteful as possible to
10

Radical Republicans".
The day following

l~.

Johnson's inauguration, Gideon Welles

was invited to Edwin M. Stantonts priYate office for a conference. Mr. Welles reports in his diary that he had not been
there long when Charles Sumner, together with several Massachusetts politicians, came to the office.

Mr.

stanton immedi-

ately took from his desk the copy of a plan for Southern re11

construction and read it before the group. Apparently, matters
were taking definite form prior to Johnson's accession.
southern people began to fear the new President, and expres$ed more faith in Lincoln as "a man of remarkable endowments". Johnson was feared because "he was understood to be
less generous in his views", and this "rendered the whole

a.

Ibid.

9. !'61'Q.
10. -rord.

11. Diary of Gideon Welles, Vol. II. New York, 1911. p. 291.
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dreadful

af~air

12

still more mysterious". The knowledge now at

hand concerning the Radical plans would certainly tend to disprove Greeley's statement in the New York Tribune that "we
feel a growing confidence that his administration will prove
13

efficient, successful, and popular". Nor is it likely that all
the people held much confidence in the idea of "one emotion in
every true American heart, and that is the most inflexible de14

termination to support President Johnson".

Perhaps The New York Times strikes the idea of American institutions best in asking people to remember that "it is impossible for any one man to be indispensable to the preservation of our Union", while in

u..

Johnson as a successor, the

nation felt it had "a man of courage, sound judgment and patriotism" who had "stood the test of the most terrible

15

trials~

Even Secretary McCulloch did not believe there was any dis-

16

trust or radical upheaval in the cabinet until the year 1866.
The President's first message seemed to please all of them,
1'1

and "none mol'e heartily than Mr. Stanton". It is a little wonder that the mass of men in America did not realize the Radioal force in opposition to the Pl'esident, when the variation
12. The Lexington Observer and

Re~orter,

13. The iew Yol'K Tribune, April 2 , 1865.
14. Harpel's Weeki~, April 29, 1865.

April 19, 1865.

15. The New Yol'kimes, April 17, 1865.
16. Hugh McCUlloch, Men and Measures of Half a Century,
lew !ork, 1888. p.39!.
17. Ibid,, p. 391.
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of opinion between Welles and MoCullooh is so great, while
both of them were active in the oa.binet, and had first hand
impressions of aotual conditions is Washington.
sorrow for the murdered President turned into more bitterness toward the South, and the results hardly agree with the
sentiment expressed in his last inaugural of ~alice toward
18
none" and "charity for all". Opinion easily turned to the
19
"real murderers whose aotion brought the Civil War", and this
necessarily meant the Southern leaders as well as those who
had supported them. This vindictive attitude, of course, demanded "that Juatioe be meted out, and Justice demands .that
treason shall be treated as a crime for which the leaders
. 20
shall be_punished". The President was desoribed as one who was
"characterized by his severity toward all enemies of the government" and to whom "a traitor was an infamous wretoh to be
21
detected and executed".
The amnesty proclamation of May 29, 1865, was the real beginning of reconstruction work under the new President. In the
opinion of some, "it seemed in every respect deserving of ap22
proval". H~pers Weekly gives a good idea of its general receptinn in confessing that it -would be better pleased with
18.
19. Atlantic Monthlf, July 1865.
20. ike chlo!io Datil Tribune, April 18, 1865.
21. ~: e conneotlou erila' April 18' 1865. New Haven, Conn.
22. !bl4., May 31, 18S5.

-
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the plan if it did not receive such unqualified

c~mmendation

from those who have most savagely denounced President

23

Johnson~

On May 12, a caucus of Republicans was held in Washington
nto consider measures for saving the new administration from
24
the conservative control which threatened it". Both Wade and
sumner insisted that the President was in favor of negro suffrage and based their assertions upon the results of many private conferences held with him. The Radical Julian introduced
the usual appeal by declaring it to be "neither morally nor
25

logically possible to escape negro suffrage".

A

man who

called Lincoln's assassination a "God-send to the country" now
spoke from the standpoint of a logician and moralist in dealing with political problems. Mr. Julian throws more light upon
his views by adding in his "ReoOlleotions" that he now went
back to Indiana to determine the attitude of his constituents.
Northern newspapers of several cities were now practically
ready to follow such a campaign for negro suffrage. The New
York Times thought it "far better that Grant had surrendered
27

to Lee than that the negro should not be allowed to vote".

The Nation believed by denying negro suffrage "in a country

-

23. Hariers

Weekl~,

24. JUl an, p. 26 •
25. Ibid.
26t

27.

!bla.

June 17, 1865.

Tne New York Times, June 10, 1865.
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where men who are denied enjoyment of political .rights ue. denied everything belonging to manhood, we would make ourselves
.

28

foolish every time we talked about Democratic principles".
so the caucus had negro suffrage as its primary obJect, and
clearly shows the determination of Radical lea4ers to force
this issue upon the President.
Signs of opposition to the Radical pla.n of suffrage came
when Andrew Johnson made a.n address on May 25, 1865, in which
he said he was· "in favor of leaving the question of suffrage
of colored persons to a decision of the loyal white residents
29

of the South".

Sumner on the same night practically admitted

what was planned, or at least prophesied what would happen, by
remarking that "Liberty has been won, but the battle of equal30

ity is still pending".

The Baltimore Sun was a champion of

the President's attitude a.nd maintained that he was only giving to the people of the s-tates the rights guuanteed when our
31

government was founded.

During June, Northern journals

claimed that the President "desires to see the negroes of the
32

South invested with power of self-protection by the ballot".

It is apparent that much of the situation now centered about
28. The Nation, July 27, 1865. New York.
29. Tne Baltimore Sunt May 27, 1865, Baltimore, Maryland.
30. !bid., June 5, 18 5.
31. !6!'a".
32. The Connecticut Herald, June 10, 1865.
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suffrage, and even though the press as a whole upheld Johnson,
yet his failure to assist in giving the ballot to the negro
~uld

immediately endanger his position in the public eye.

Virginia had an organized government under Governor Francis
pe±rpont, which had carried over from Lincoln's

t~rm.

On May

9, Johnson recognized this government, and thereby tended to
antagonize certain leaders. Oberholtzer feels that the "Negro33

philes" already feared a change in the President by this time.
Thaddeus Stevens wrote to Sumner immediately following the
recognition of the Peirpont government asking if there might
be a way "to arrest the insane course of the President in re34

organization".

First indications of a change in the press

occurred on July 10, 1865, when The Chicago Daily Tribune
claimed the Lincoln-Johnson policy would produce nothing but
35

"shame and disaster".

Lincoln's plan as followed by his suc-

cessor was becoming unacceptable.
Editorial opinion in the South could have helped to create
a good impression in the North if the editors would have realized how much was to depend on the attitude shown by the
leaders of the South. Instead of this, however, we read indications in private letters of this period showing the real
situation. A chaplain in the

Uni~army

who had served in

33. Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer, History of the United States,
Vol. f: p. 41.
34. Ibid.

35.

The Chicago Triiune, July, 10, 1865.

-25Virginia during the war wrote to Judge J. D. Davidson of Lexington, Virginia, in 1865, as follows; "I have had many friends
invite me to Virginia, promising me the best meal of hominy
and milk I could desire. But your papers and editors look dis36

couraging". Another letter written June 1, 1865, desoribes
conditions in Staunton, Virginia, and vicinity. "We are in the
dark here and do not discover a way of coming to light. We have
no newspapers from the North except those that occasionally, by
chance, get through. I send you but one Richmond paper--it is
37
all we can raise since our ears run only tri-weekly". rt is
evident that many people in the South must have been uninformed
about affairs in their own area, to say little of the country
as a whole; and most of the material that was circulated came
from anti-Northern journals. The Lexington Observer and Reporter made
..........

some rash statements about this time. mr.henever the

people of Kentucky desire to get rid of slavery, they will do
so in their own way, but will take oare not to meddle with the
property of their neighbors. We will not willingly entrust the
most delicate of our affairs to the 'appropriate legislation'
38
of Congress".
36. Letter written by I. Moilwaine to Judge J.D. Davidson,
Lexington, VIrginia, June 1, !865, in the Moeorm!ok Historical Society, Chicago, Illinios. Original letter.
37. Ibid,, Mr. w. Frank to Judge Davidson. June 1, 1865.
38. ~Lexington Observer an4 Reporter, March 25, 1865.
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NewEngland had a good opportunity, in the faCJe of such remarks, to heap criticism upon the South, and The Connecticut
Herald started the campaign. "Before Congress meets there will
be a united North, demanding in a tone no Congress can disre39

gard, the denial of all civil power to rebel states".

Rad-

icals were also busy, and took advantage of such opinion to
write directly to Johnson. Thaddeus stevens asked him to "hold
40 .

his hand and await the action of Congress".

A definite break

was not yet made, and we find The Chicago Daily Tribune approv

41

ing "some features of the President's plan".

The main object-

ion still held was regar4ing Preeidential action as final "pri42

or to its endorsement by Congress and the people".

Harpers

Weekly held the idea that "Johnson initiated action and congress completes it,- a principle all loyal men of the union
43

will certainly heartily endorse".

Furthermore, this journal

maintained that "there was nothing in the acts or words of
Johnson to Justify the insinuation that he wishes to intrust
44

political power to the late rebels", and that the only loyal
45

thing to do was to "patiently wait".

39. The connecticut Herald, August 1, 1865.
p. 41.
40. Oberholtzer, Vol.

v.

41. The Chicago Tribune, September 23, 1865.

rbta.

42.
43. Har_!ers Weeklt, July 22, 1865~
44. Ibl ., Septem er 2, 1865.
45. Ibid., September 30, 1865.

-27A gradual restoration of the southern states became more
impossible because the problem became primarily a political
one, and negro voting was the issue over which this was ultimately !ought out. In March, 1865, a southern paper had said;
"the political and social equality of the negro is the object
46
aimed at by the Radicals of our last Congress". Then a few
months later, Northern journals were conjecturing as to just
how long it would require for negroes to be prepared for citizenship. It was thought "these four million loyal citizens
could be educated speedily under competent officers, and then
47

go out to put down brigandage and preserve social order". Over
against this extreme radicalism it was urged upon the people
to be patient and not "expect the South to be thorough-going
abalitionists and advocates of negro suffrage", simply because
48
they had been defeated in the ~. It was beginning to be evi
dent to many by this time that the suffrage question was diverting attention from more vital issues of human need, and
The Baltimore Sun openly accused Wilson and Sumner of acting
49
"for partisan expediency", and defied these leaders to prove
they never had favored the use o! federal power in determining
matters relating to suffrage in their own state.
46. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, March 22, 1865.
47 •. ~1 !ie dhlojto Tribune, April 26, 1865.
48. The Bait more Sun~ June 16, 1865.
49. !bid., JUly 14, 1 65.
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The people seemed disposed to await the progress of the experimental government then going on in the South and leave the
final deeision until later. It was agreed upon by most editors
50
"who in reality lead public opinion", that "not one among the
distinguished opponents of President Johnson ever states that
51
Abraham Lincoln's policy would have been different"• Press
opinion steadily worked on the idea that Congress must be consulted, and many editors traced governmental growth to show
the absolute necessity for caution in the use of Presidential
power. Therefore, when Congress convened on December 4, 1865,
it is quite certain that some of the members had definite
plans made contrary to the Lincoln-Johnson policy. Even though
the people did seem disposed in the beginning to await the results of experimental government, the fact remains that their
representatives theoretically expressed public opinion by demanding an entirely new plan.
While main issues were being brought up, the leader of our
nation met regularly with a cabinet seleoted by his predecessor.

~uestions

of reconstruction came up here, and any direct

antagonism or opposition to Presidential policy in the cabinet
would undoubtedly work for

t~ouble.

Gideon Welles, Secretary

of the Navy, indicates in Bebruary, 1866, that a clique. in
50. The washinfton Chronicle, September 24, 1865.
51. Ibid., Sep ember 28, 18&5 •

,. -------------------------------------------------------------·
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opposition to the administration, with Henry Winter Davis as
leader, had erown up in Washington. "Secretary Stanton is on
terms with these men, and to some extent gives them oounte52

nanoe even in their war upon the President".
keep in mind here that
Lincoln's

~&binet

t~

It is well to

factions were plainly in action in

before his death. Then when Johnson came to

power, Hugh McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury, says he requested the O&binet members during the first session to stand
by him in the crisis. "He appeared relieved when we assured
him that while we felt it our duty to place our resignations
in his hands, he should have the benefit of our services un53
til he saw fit to dispense with themn. This verbal agreement
seems sufficient evidence to lead one to think that the members were willing to abide by Johnson's wishes, and to resign
whenever he saw fit to demand it. It McCulloch's word is taken
for it, "the first year's administration was cordially support
54
ed by every member of the Oabinet".
Clear judgment concerning the actual progress of

r~·

struotion was clouded somewhat because of a lack of information, or an abundance of misinformation. As a result, the
press spends considerable time in the use of flowing phrases
which did not bear directly upon human need, and which did not
52. Welles, Vol. II, P• 247.
53. McCulloch, p. 37&.
54. Ibid.

r-------------30-

correspond to the action in Congress. Such very obvious phrase
as, "It is one of the most critical periods of our history,
and the people will all rejoice if the President and Congress
55
should agree", make onewonder what the people were doing to
make such a state of affaire come to pass. The Lincoln-Johnson
plan was cons1dere4 to be "sanctioned by every consideration
of national Justice and political expediency, and in spite of
all fanatical or factious opposition in North or South it will
56
certainly prevail". Radical justification went the limit, and
in the interest and supreme welfare of our nation "looked to
the recuperation of the negro as far more hopeful than changing the old slave-holding class from the curse of wrong and
57
oppression they have been pursuing". Sectionalism, Puritanism
and political expediency demanded something more than a mere
return to the fold.
Evidence has already been brought forth to indicate that
prearranged plans were ready for operation when Congress assem
bled on December 4, 1865. Some Cabinet members were doubtful
supporters of the nation's chief and, unquestionably, several
Congressional leaders were directly opposed to his plan. Despite all of this, there is evidence in several Northern papers that people were warned or the situation and later voted
55. Harpers Weekly, october 14, 1865.
56. The New York Times, october 11, 1865.
57. The chicago bally Tribune, June 21, 1865.
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direatly against supporting Johnson. The Philadelphia Ledger
judged it was an understanding among majority leaders of cron58

gress to refuse admission to "rebel states",

and the Balti-

more Sun added that "the President's labor of love would go
59

tor nothing if this happens".

At least a portion of the peop-

le in Northern States were in tavor of amnesty, but realized
already that preconceived plans would most likely prevent it.
Word from the South usually cast a cloud over hopes of amnesty, for there is little doube that people there were quite
indiscreet in handling affairs while hatred was at such a high
level. In an original letter written to Judge

J.D~

Davidson of

Lexington, Virginia, these words appear; "We e.re getting along
as well as could be expected under militia rule---there are
restrictions which are rather disagreeable, suoh as remaining
indoors after dark, and doing nothing which looks like an in60
sult to our fl&£"• Later in 1865, another letter WTitten to
this same Judge Davidson describes the Congress.

~ell,

this

Yankee Congress is not doing us any good. The Lord only knows
what will eome of it.--Great Godl we can't stand negro equality
61

in suffrage and our juries".

58. The Baltimore Sun, November 23, 1865.
59. !bid.
60. Letter written to Judge J.D. Davidson, by N. Frank, Staunton, Virginia., June 1, 1865. In the MeCormiall Historical
Society, Chicago, Illinois. Original letter.
61. Ibid., By F.J. Manay, December 8, 1865.
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Most Radical papers used hasty action as a universal evil,
and exploited such an idea to the limit to prevent public
opinion from demanding that Johnson's plan be used. In order
to prove the futility of depending upon Southern people,
southern Black Codes were published.

~south

Carolina passed

stringent Black Codes, while Mississippi elected a Rebel Gov62
ernor", said The Chicago Daily Tribune. ~Louisiana is on the
down grade, while Georgia and Alabama show plainly that they
are not to be

63
trusted~.

The idea of reinstating eleven states

of this type, according to the Radicals, was nothing short of
64

"political insanity".

Probably the most difficult problem was to actually present
evidence of genuine Southern conditions, because it is f'airly
certain that such evidence passed through too much Congressional Committee work to remain thoroughly accurate. Even if it
had passed through in the original form, nothing short of patience and aanesty would have allowed these Southern people a
chance. Perhaps private letters give us a good a view as any.
One letter, written December 5, 1865, by a resi4ent of Shreveport, Louisiana, says, "I will give you a passing glance of
this section of the country. In the first place, neither life,
limb nor property is safe now, since the Yankees occupied this
62. The Chicago Daily Tribune, November 29, 1865.
63.
64.

!bid.
!'61T.

-
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place. One can form an idea of

a country swarming with idle,

dissolute, improvident negroes and garrisoned with negro troop
Yankee cotton agents are having a good time; they seize upon a
lot of private cotton and then offer to release it if the party will pay them a heavy bonus or divide.---This state of affairs prevails not only in this section of the country, but in
65

many parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Texas".

Evidence of Northern aggression or incompetence, and Southern
disloyalty is about evenly balanced so far as communications
are concerned.
Among the more conservative elements of the North there was
a general reeling at the close of 1865 that Congress and President would ultimately solve the problem together. Harpers
Weekly was firm in the opinion that the Southern experiment
was quite successful enough to see no reason for doubting its
continuation. The washington Chronicle believed "Thaddeus stevens will live to see the day when his gloomy predictions will
pass away before a lasting peace. We cannot yield to his doo66
trine of Conquered Provinces".
Since the time when our Constitution was formed, there has
been a controversy over fundaaental rights vested in the several branches of the nation's government. "Already then,

~8C%O

suffrage is reduced to a pra"Cf't-ioal necesai ty and practioal
65. Letter written by D. Campbell, Shreveport, Louisiana, to
Cousin James (Davidson), Lexington, Virginia. December 5,
1865. Chio~o Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois.
66.The Washington Chronicle, December 20, 1865

r
67
wisdom". The reason given was, that since Johnson had prescribed conditions for the South, then Congress, under the Con
&titution, had the same right. This implied, evidently, that
loyal negroes were necessary to create a loyal South, and
thereby elect Congressmen who would support Congressional power. New Sngland, through The Connecticut Herald saw some hope
for the South in "the infusion of new blood from the North and
68
the development of an enlightened South". Similar statements
occurred

~uite

often in several papers of the North. History

has later shown what this Northern enlightenment proved to be,
and letters of this same time clearly indicate conditions already in existence in 1865. The word exploitation is better
suited as a descriptive term than enlightenment.
aongressional action began in December, 1865, and with its
advent, the New York press believed any one looking for a
break between President and Congress would be "utterly dis69

appointed".

These editorial opinions went further astray in

maintaining that "unless we are greatly mistaken, the American
people will give Johnson such support as has never been accorded to any Chief Magistrate since the days of Andrew Jaok70
son". Indiaations of other developments were manifested when
Congress proceeded without waiting for the usual Presidential
67.
68.
69.
70.

The Connecticut Herald, June 30, 1865.
Ibid., November 3o, 1865.
The New York Times, November 25, 1865.
Ibid., December 2&, 1865.
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message. Radical papers excused this glaring omission by saying it was done, "in all probability in fUll understanding
71
with the President". Gideon Welles thinks such understanding
was not established, and furthermore, Johnson had sent Horace
Maynard to prevent Steven's effort to have a Reconstruction
committee appointed. Both sides at least understood that trouble was approaching. Welles says Johnson told him the Reconstruction Committee would be

~nocked

in the head" by Maynard.

He concludes his remarks on this subject by mentioning the
fact that Congress also did not send the usual committee to
inform Mr. Johnson of its organization. Welles thinks this was
73
not unintentional, but had a definite "design in it".
At the close of 1865, direct attacks upon the President
were still unpopular, and resented by the Northern press. This
is shown bt criticism of Charles Sumner's speeches against
Johnson in December, 1865. Sumner, who prided himself upon his
dignity and poise, was accused of being "in very bad taste, to
74
asy the least", while scorning the President at this time.
Oberholtzer says, "Whoever will follow the record of the fall
and summer of 1865, cannot fail to form the opinion that the
71. The Connecticut Herald, December72. Welles, Vol. II, P• 388
73. Ibid.
74. ~Nation, December 28, 1865.

4,

1865.
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president, throughout that time, labored with industry, tact,
75

and patriotism".

Rhodes summarized the situation as

follows:~

"The question was fairly before congress am4 the country; with
the main bouy of Republicans in the House and Senate as the
jury, Johnson was the advocate of one side, while Sumner and
76

stevens were on the other".

Many editorials did not indicate that the whole question
had resolved

itself into a legal combat between President and

Congress, as is indicated by The Washington Chronicle:- "If
the South wishes to be fully restored to the Union and to enjoy all the blessings whioh it affords, they have only to comply with Congress and the President and the general policy of
77

our goverament".

The actual Radical interpretation of this

policy is stated by The Chicago Daill Tribune; "If there is to
be any hanging back now against Constitutional Amendments,
they will find negro suffrage at their doors by the unanimous
78

voice of the North".

The Connecticut Herald thought "the Pres

ident will not take strong ground either way, but will leave

79

the admission of Rebel States to the decision of Congress",

Another newspaper said, "Neither the President nor the people'
75. Oberholtzer, Vol. v. p.l43.
76. James Ford Rhodes, Histor~ of the United States, from the

Compromise of IS o. New York, Vol. VI. '· 553.
77. The Washington Chronicle, December 24, 1865.
78. The chicago Tribune, November 14, 1865.
79. The connecticut Her&.ld, Deoember 5, 1865.
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representatives in Congress, if we understand their relative
positions, have any other purpose in view but to bring baak
the seaeded states on terms of perfeat equality with those who
80

have continued loyal to the Union". These statements, while
yarying from one another somewhat, still show that people were
led to think that the policy used would. be agreed upon by legislative and exeautive departments together, and. certainly
gave no indication of a battle between the two, with Congress
as a jury. It is necessary to follow these issues on into 1866
before an open break appears in the pub1ia press.

so.

The Washington Chronicle, Deaember 4, 1865.
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CH.APTER III
Intimate glimpses of politioal movements appear in the memoirs of two Cabinet members, Welles ana McCulloch. On January
8, 1866,

Welles reports, "!he President ana the Radioal

L~.

leaders are not in direct conflict, but I see not how it is to
l

be avoided".

McCulloch said, "he (Johnson) disagreed with

congress (as his predecessor would have done had he lived) in
regard to what should be required of the Southern States, but
he was not the aggressor, and although his course was in some
respects

indefe~sible,

he little merited the obloquy which was

2

heaped upon him". Day by day the relationship was becoming
more strained, and Welles plainly indicates Stanton's turn to
Radical policy, which gave a good connection for the Radicals
in securing information, as well as blocking plans of Presi3

dent Johnson.

Henry J. Raymond, editor of The New York Times,was one
friend of the President who started the year of 1866 with an
open declar .. tion of support by claiming, "ndlthing is left to
be compromised. The fact is, the work of restoration is nearly
4

complete". It seemed to him

tha~

opposition to President Jo)n-

son's plans would be justifiable only insofar as it was not in
harmony with Mr. Lincoln's plan, since the Northern people
l.
2.
3.
4.

Welles, Vol. II. P• 412.
McCulloch, p. 405.
Welles, p. 424.
The New York Timesz January 9, 1866.
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gave Lincoln their support. !he newly organized Southern governments were a part of Lincoln's plan, so the only logical
thing to do was to recognize them.

w~.

Raymond was but one ot

a minority group in the House, destined to be crushed by the
opposition under the leadership of Thaddeus Stevens.
Very little opportunity was lett for a President to exert
honest effort and express individual ideas when a leAding West
ern paper declared "if the President quarrels with Congress,
it will be for the purpose of following in the footsteps of
5

his three apostate predecessors--Tyler, Fillmore, and Buchanan
This opinion was carried to its conclusion in hoping for no
trouble, and believing that no trouble would occur if the "act
ing President" would confine himself to his legitimate func6
tiona and not interfere in the business of Congress. Congressional supremacy is uzged still further by New England editors
who looked to Congress as a well-nigh perfect representation
of the people. The Boston Transcript thought, "at no time
since the adoption of the Constitution have the Senate and
House so perfectly represented their constituencies. It belongs to Congress preeminately to settle the terms of recon7

struction". The argument brought forth in behalf of such
action included, first of all, a warning against hasty recon5. The
6.

7.

Chic~o

rbia.
The Boston

Daily Tribune, January 3, 1866.
Transcript, January 12, 1866. Boston, .assaohusetts.
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struction, and secondly, a reminder of Southern hatred, which,
according to New England editors, was quelled only because the
confederacy was unable to fight any longer. Then, even though
the Southern States were not represented, it was thought that
the North would oare for all local affairs, so nothing mote
8

was necessary from the standpoint of human need.
In 1861. Johnson deolared

in the

u.s.

Senate that no power

existed anywhere to deolare a siate out of the union. He held
the same &pinion in 1866, when Congress, under Sumner, stevens,
9

and their associates aimed to do that very thing.

The group

supporting Johnson called Congressional action a "Radical
assault", whioh is in agreement with McCulloch's statements
that Johnson was
~

not the aggressor. The National Intelligen-

said, "!he people want reunion. The American masses, with
10

their President, are looking to Peace".

There is little evi-

dence at this point to show Presidential inconsistency, although there is considerable· to prove insurgent plotting
against the administration. One thing may be stated for certain; Johnson was not a "drunken imbecile", as a Bishop stated
a few years after his administration closed. This remark
passed without rebuke, and was published without a comment in
later years, which indicates the attitude of the American
8. Ibid., January 25, 1866.
9. The National Intelli~enoer, January 2, 1866. washington D.C.
lO.Ibid., January 5, 18 6.
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ll
people toward their seventeenth President.
Editoritls of The Chicago Daily Tribune denounced the South
ern reconstruction policy under Johnson as nothing more than
the return of a caste system "which distinguished the laws and
12
customs of the South". In the editorials of The Boston Transcript, which was said to be the organ of Charles Sumner in
New England, Thaddeus stevens was held up as a champion of the
people, beoause,,as that paper said, "in his fight he trusts
to the people to sustain whatever is just and humane; and in
13

that trust feels assuzed, as well he may, of a final victory".
To continue in Congress despite the absence of eleven states
was no serious handicap in 1866, according to the Radicals.
The Boston Transcript said, "the people are not under control
of party demagogues or manners, but are voting and thinking
for themselves. The majority in Congress are not ahead of the
14
wishes of their constituents". All of this evasion of issues
and political writing simply will not bear the test of experience or the testimony of history.

Andrew Johnson looked upon himself as the representative of
all the American people. He had been consistent enough up to
11.
12.
13.
14.

McCulloch, p. 407.
The Chicago Daily Tribune, February 5, 1866.
The Boston Transcrlp't, February 2, 1866.
Ibid., february 16, 1866.

--------------------------------------------------------------.
this time to create the impression that he "represented a po15

sition both politically and Constitutionally strong".

From

this time forward, criticism of his work began to take a more
open form. No better examples of disregard for Presidential
authority need be given than the attitude displayed by the
opening of Congress in December, 1865. That group of leaders
proceeded without waiting for a Presidential message, which
was contrary to all established precedent. Thaddeus Stevens
now went further on February 16, 1866, by adding, "we shall
not trouble President Johnson by sending him this amendment
(the Fourteenth), if it is passed by Congress, because it is
1&
not necessary to submit it to him for his approval". Such a
statement was an open insult, and may be taken as one more indication of Radical determination. The President had shown one
significant change thus far, and that was a desire to recognize the Southern State governments after he had opened his
term of office with severe denunciations of the rebels. Radicals interpreted this as traitorous activity rather than a
genuine desire to rebuild the South, or at least they claimed
to hold this view.
On February 6, 1866, the seoond Freedmen's Bureau Bill was
ready for the President's signature. This reorganized the former lureau and continued its activity as a means of oaring for
15. The New York Times, February 14, 1866.
16. Harpers Weekly, February 17, 1866.

L

-43the South. February twentieth and twenty-first, 1866, were
days of editorial outbursts throughout the country in answer
to the veto of this Bill. One journal stated bluntly, "by this
formal aot he has severed himself from the loyal party and
17
united with the enemy". His reason that it was not needed
opened the way for criticism, because the first aat expired
18

May 1, 1866. This reason was called a Wpositively silly one",
and also led to the more radical supposition that the Presi-

dent proposed to use the veto power now to prevent successful
legislation until therepresentatives from the Southern States
19

were admitted.

He now had made a stand that was definite

enough to place him in open hostility to a Radical Congress.
Sumner's supporting journal looked

wi~h

"profound

20
regret~

upon

the veto, while The New York Times thought it was "not at variance with either the majority or Congress or the country in
21
any essential point". The Bureau Bill provided for an opportunity of increased governmental activity and expenditure, and
furthermore, had originated "solely as a war measure". It represented a form a form of government which was burdensome, and
if the Presidential plan were carried through, there would
22
have been no justification for it. The National Intelligencer
17. The Chicago Daily Tribune, February 21, 1866.
18. Ibid.

l9.rnl'i.

20. The Boston Transcript, February 20, 1866.
21. The New fork Times, Febr·uary 20, 1866.
2~. The National Intelligenaer, February 17, 1866.
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noped th&t, "even if the President signs it, his prudence and
23
diseretion may save us from some of its dangers". Therefore,

we see some opinion strongly against the bill even before the
veto, and after the veto, The New York Sun upheld Johnson by
saying, "the veto is no sign at all that he has broken with
24
his party" •

•

While this was fresh in the minds of the people, 1lr. Johnson made a speech which cast more gloom over his prospeets of
maintaining public opinion in support of his plan. In the address he uttered many remarks of a somewhat undignified nature,
and ended by mentioning the names of a few opponents, thereby
openlJ committing himself against them. Thaddeus stevens,
Charles Sumner, and Wendell Phillips were named as men who
work acainst the fundamental principles of our government, and
Johnson excited the boisterous merriment of the audience by
calling John

w.

Forne7 "a dead duck" upon whom he "would not
25
waste his ammunition". This was a dangerous pastime because
Mr. Forney was secretary of the Senate, and editor of The Wash

ington Chronicle. That journal then turned against Johnson and
fought him to the end, where&s it was quite friendly up to
this time. Another noticeable change against the President is
shown in that powerful New York publication, The Nation. The
23. Ibid.
24. !"6!Q., February 20, 1866.
25. ~Schurz, Reminiscences, Kew York, 1907, Vol. III, p.22
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February twenty-second speech (1866) left the situation in
suoh a state that most Radicals looked upon the executive power now as a threat capable of delaying, but not preventing
26
congressional action.
A regular campaign was inaugurated by Radical foroes preparatory to forcing through a Freedmen's Bureau and a Civil
Rights Bill. Among the Congressional supporters it was thought
"all that loyal men need to do now is to fortify themselves
against Johnson's attacks by passing such laws as shall leave
27

him powerless or remove him altogether".

After such remarks

as Johnson made on February 22, it was vain to look for any
further cooperation of President and Congress, and his staunoh
supporters stated that they were not surprised at a Radical
campaign throughout the country because they "did not see how,
as politicians, the Radicals could pursue any other course
28

than the one they had adopted".

And above all things, these

Congl'essmen wel'e politicians, so a deliberate attempt by the
29

President "to make them and their party odious"

was answel'ed

with an energetic campaign. It was also sarcastically proposed
by ElL. Godkin that "a commission composed of conservative
politicians be framed to

en~uire

by what authority Congress

26. The Boston Transcript, February 23, 1866,
27. The chlcagi bali{ Tribune, February 23, 1866.
28. The lew York Wor d, March 1, 1866.
29. !bid.
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meddles in the government of this country at

30

all~.

It was cer-

tainly a matter of regret that Congress and the President
should differ so decidedly at this i$portant moment, but it
was very absurd now to expect, as Harpers Weekly did, that
"Congress should take the initiative in returning to coopera31

tion with the President".

Mr. George William Curtis of Har-

pers Weekly thought this would be possible if Congressmen really studied the Constitution and saw the branches of government in their proper aspects. He said, "The President is but
a coordinate branch of the government. He is not the superior
32

of Congress or the Supreme Court".

Whatever attitudes might

have been taken, the fact remains that Radical forces scorned
the very idea that Johnson had followed Lincoln's plan, and
the press was filled with talk about this 'assault' for a week
or more. Each side regarded the other as guilty of the original 'assault'.
Using the first veto, together with the

~bruary

twenty-

second speech as a basis, the opposition moved forward to execute the program of their •committee on Reconstruction' with
a new spirit of mastery. The intense feeling of antagonism be-

-

came more aroused as some editors thanked the President for
30. The Nation, March 8, 1866.
3l.Har~ers Weiklz, March 10, 1866.
32, Ib d,, Maioh 17, 1866.
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nthe vigor and intelligence with which he called Congress to a
sense of its duties, and for the pluck which has enabled him,
more or less completely, to baffle the plans of the disunion33

ists".

Colonel Fornev was told nit would be utterly idle for

him or anybody else to proseoute war upon the President" because it will be impossible to force suoh hatreds upon the
H

people".. most of the appeal to the people was necessarily
based upon success in handling reorganized Southern States, to
gether with the negro suffrage problem, so affairs hung in the
balance until President or Congress could win a vote of confidence. It may be too harsh to say that Johnson"was in a mood
as bitter and defiant as that of the extremest Radical of the
35

Congressional maJority", or that "by aheer rashness and intemperance he forced the consolidation of the majority against
36

him",

but it seems unnecessary for a President to use his

veto power as he did against the Freedmen's Bill, and it is
nothing short of absurd and ridiculous to have a national executive engage in a useless tirade suoh as he gave in his February twenty-second speech.
Not all of the opposition went to an extreme because of
these acts, however, and

~~.

Godkin of The Nation is a good

example. He urged the people to remember that, "no matter
33. Ha.l.'~ers Weekly, 'Ma.l.'oh 10, 1866.
34. !bl ., February 26, 1866.
35. WOOtrrow Wilson, A History of the American Peotle, Vol.
lew York, 19o1 p. 2
36. Ibid.

v.
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what

1~.

Johnson may say or do, he is our President, and his

shame is our shame, a fact which people in the excitement of
37

party contests are apt to forget".

The Boston Transcript

lists The Washington Chronicle and Philadelphia Press as
friendly to Johtlson at this time, and both were edited by M.r.
Forney. But editorials in these Journals gradually became more
intense against llr. Johnson, until the following summary was
made by the Washington Chronicle in the fall of 1866; "The
present deplorable condition in the South is the necessary result of the President's policy and of his political associations. He now belongs with the whole rebel population of the
38

South".

The New York Tribune,whioh was recognized by anti39

Johnson papers as being friendly to him, spoke of Johnson's
inebriation as an excuse for his recent outbursts, and later
expressed regret that "the best excuse which could be offered
40
for it could no longer be pleaded in palliation". Executive
ability has declined to a low ebb when intoxication is usea
to excuse a public address, and no matter what his former
reoord had been or how staunchly he now supported the people,
or whether he ever was intoxic&tea in his life, indications
from the press of that day show plainly that he created a
tremendous

~orce

of public

op~hion

37. The Nation, 1A:aroh 15, 1866.

against his cause. !his,

38. The Washington Chronicle, September 14, 1866.
39. The Boston Transcript, ~oh 13, 1866.
40. The New York Times, February 24, 1866.

in the end, defeated the very plan for which he seemed to be

working, and Judging from his tactless procedure, he was instrumental in aggravating his own downfall.
Senator Trumbull of Illinois had now seen his Freedmen's
Bureau Bill defeated, but a second bill was brought forth by
him, called the Civil Rights Bill, under which the negroes
were declared to be citizens of the United States. By

]~ch

13,- it had passed the House and wa.s ready for the President's
signature.

Harpers weekly hoped, by March 31, that "the bill
41

might be approved by him and become a law".

But while most

people were uncertain as to what Johnson would do, and at a
time when logical thought was needed, Thaddeus Stevens gave a
speech in the House in which he disrespectfully harangued the
42

Chief Executive.

This led some to say "Thaddeus Stevens had

no single quality of a statesman except fidelity to a princi43

ple",

which necessarily meant his principle, and the further

remark, "we insist that Mr. Johnson has reason to be hurt and
indignant when he is represented as the friend and ally of
44

red-handed rebels".

Even if Stevens' remarks were erratic and

unnecessarily bitter, it was no excuse for an unnecessary
veto, if it is felt that the veto was uncalled for by circumstances.
41. Har~ers weekly, March 31,1866.
p. 582.
42. Rho es, Vol.
43. Har~ers Weekly, April 7, 1866.
44. !hi •

v.

r
-50-

While the bill was pending in Congress it was diseussed by
the Cabinet, where Seward, McCulloch, and Welles supported
Johnson's plan of a veto. John Sherman's private letters claim
that Johnson "deceived and misled his best friends". Sherman
says, "I know he led many to believe he would agree to the
45

Civil Rights Bill".

Rhodes says that Governor Oliver P. Mor-

ton of Indiana hastened to Washington, D.C. and begged the
President to sign the bill, urging that otherwise the rent be46

tween him and his party would be beyond mending".

Governor

!lorton's prestige may be judged by some words of George W.
Julian of the Radicals. Julian had little reason to heap flatt
ery upon Morton for the two were life-long political enemies,
and he adds, "I only make these statements in justice to the
47
truth", for "it oannot be denied his services to the country
48
in this orisis were great•, and summarizes his importance as
follows:- "Governor Morten was a phenomenal figure in American
politics during the war period, and played a very remarkable
49

part in the affairs of his Party".

Apparently, Johnson misled

some of the political leaders to the same extent that he did
in giving an anti-rebel impression when he first aoceded to
offioe. And secondly, he made the veto appear as a defiance,
45.
46.
47.
48.

Rhodes, Vol.V, p. 582.
Ibid., P• 583.
Julian, p. 271.
Ibid., P• 270.
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since there was certainly no reason why this bill would have
wrecked his plan at all, and there were several reasons why
the veto did do that. McCulloch upheld the veto in the Cabinet
session, but some years later recorded that "the veto of the
Civil Rights Bill turned not only the Republican Party, but
the general public sentiment of Northern people against Johnson, and from that time

on~d

there was open hostility be50

tween legislative and executive branches of the government".

one advantage in using advisers is supposedly the better opportunity of having insight plus foresight. In this ease,

1~.

McCulloch's insight functioned almost twenty years too late to
be of any puticular use, if we

ma~

judge from the above

statement taken from his reminiscences of this period.
Following the veto, some declared it was only what they expected, and added that "the arguments of the veto are loaned
51

Mr. Johnson by some Democratic lawyers in Washington D.C."
The Chicago Daily Tribune openly called for impeachment;

~e

believe on the simple merits of his action he deserver to be
impeached by the House, tried before the Senate, and removed
52

from office".

President Johnson stated in his veto that he

represented all of the people, while Congressmen had only a
section or separ.&ie group of constituents. In reply to this,
50. McCulloch, p. 381.
51. The Boston Transcript, March 28, 1866
52. The Chloago Dally Tribune, Maroh 31, 1866.
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-52The Atlantic Monthly maintained that he was not elected to
represent all of the people. "The President was not elected by
the voice of the loyal people for the office he now holds. Our
53
congressmen were elected for the exact position they hold".
As to protecting the rights of eleven Southern states, it was
seriously doubted whether "magnanimity which sacrifices the

M

innocent in order to propitiate the guilty" is highly desirable. As we have seen, Mr. McCulloch admitted later that this
veto turned general opinion in the North, and it may be added
here that as a political move it was quite tactless, inasmuch
as it opened the way for an almost complete Radical victory.
About the only thing in Johnson's favor is the fact that
the Radicals had carefully planned against him, and the evidence is too strong to deny. Henry J. Raymond brought this out
after the veto by asking the country not to forget that "the
critical period through which we are passing is the result not
of Presidential caprice, obstinacy or ambition, but of the
disposition of the Radicals to force through legislation look55
ing to negro supremacy in the South". Welles wrote earlier in
March, 1866, •stevens is determined to have an issue between
the Executive and Congress, notwithstanding that the country
deprecates such an issue. I incline to the opinion that, by
53. The Atlantic Monthly, Ap*il, 1866.
54. Ibid.
55. The New York Times, March 31, 1866.
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,r~-------' the working of his Directory machinery, he will be successful
~~

56
in raising that issue". These remarks only substantiate what

has been said prior to this concerning a determination of one
group to :right the ahief Executive, and Stevens' bitter speech
made before the veto may have been nothing more

a foul
57
method of evoking that veto to aggravate public opinion.
t~an

So far as editorial opinion is concerned, the February
twenty-seconl speech an4 the first veto of the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill rather than the Civil Rights Bill marks the signifieant change against Andrew Johnson. For a year fhe Chicago
Daily Tribune had criticized him, but with the addition of
John

w.

Forney and E.L. Godkin to the opposition, journalistic

creation of public opinion was decidedly anti-Johnson. Mr.
Godkin openly denounced much that aohnson did, but when impeachment was imminent a year later, he reminded the American
public of Johnson's past patriotism and pleaded for patience.
"Andrew Johnson has in times past been tried and not found
wanting in patriotism, in devotion to the Union, in faithful58
ness to his obligations". It is certainly not fair to claim,as
George

w.

Julian di&,that the veto of the Bureau Bill "stripped
59

Johnson of all disguises". The evidence shows him to be obstinate, tactless, and erat1e in speech, but it does not prove
56. Welles, Vol. II, p.443.
57. Rhodes, Vol. V, p.582.
58. The Nation, March 1, 1867.
59. Julian, p. 274.
'
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that

~everybody

could now see the mistake of his nomination

60

at Baltimore".

Furthermore, there is little reason, so far as

editorial opinion indicates, for supporting

Woo~row

Wilson's

conjention that "a less headstrong man might by conference
have hit upon some plan by whioh his differences with the lead
61
ers in Congress would have been accommodated". Negor suffrage
was demanded, and there is great doubt as to whether any other
accommodation would have been considered. At any rate, it was
no time to defy Northern opinion and strengthen Congress by
resistance when Congressional elections were so near. Could
Johnson have held his tongue and signed the two bills, his sup
port in Congress would have undoubtedly been made stronger by
the new elections. He gave up that opportunity and chose a way
that was destined to bring him defeat.
Opinion was divided in suoh a way as to give credit to Congress while Johnson appeared as a rather stubborn individual.
"The President is unquestionably pure of purpose and very
determined, but the equal integrity, ability, devotion and
62

firmness of Congress cannot be questioned".

So long as suoh

an opinion existed, and Johnson defied Congress, thea people

were likely to vote against him. The New York Herald added an

60. Ibid.

61. wrrion, Vol. v. p. 32.
62. Harpers Weekly-, April 14, 1866.
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I

enlightening statement that the Congressional party in America
was made up of " The God-fearing and Bible reading portion of
63

the people". Now that an appeal had been made to Puritanical
elements, the next th&ng was to hearken back to Lincoln's day
and show some discrepancy between Johnson and Lincoln. In his
last public speech

1~.

Lincoln said,"the Executive claims no

right to say when or whether members should be admitted to
64

seats in Congress". This statement became quite prom&nent as
a quotation in an effort to induce some degree of submission
on Johnson's part to Congressional measuzes. The New York
wnrld

concluded that the "earnestness" of Congressional mem-

bers was best mamtfested by the open call foe impeachment on
the part of Radical papers. "The faot that the mask is thrown
off evinces the intense malignity and 'earnestness' of Presi65

dential enemies". Obviously, the entire problem now facedaa
final solution at the ballot box.
The Radicals used future elections as a threat and it was
quite apparent that no compromise was possible, The Boston
Transcript said, " Mr. Johnson can indulge in self-will and
passion. The issue will finally be settled at the ballot box,
and defeat is assured those who reconstruct states out of
66

Rebel material". The chief

alm~ow

was mot to conciliate, but

63. The New York Herald, July Z, 1866.
64. Harper$ Weeklt' lpril 21, 1866.
65. The lew Yorkorld, April 5, 1866.
66. The Bos£on Triiscript, June 5, 1866.

to

67

K

set upon a platform for public support". All hope of con-

ciliation lay in

sub~ission

on Johnson's part, and at this

stage of the battle it is difficult to see just why he should
have submitted. Almost anyone could see that " a little radicalism under the circumstances was perhaps natural and pardon68
89
able~, but the insistence upon " making treason odious" meant
treating the South as a conquered p%ovinoe, and this, in ttzn,
was relinquishing all policy in favor of Mr. Stevens,together
with his Radical supporters in the House and Senate.
Undoubtedly consistency is an admirable trait, but Mr, Stevens' consistency had by this time developed into a policy of
"Radicalism, olear and undisguised; Partisanship,stern and un70

relenting". There no longer was a middle ground of reason between M.r. stevens and the President, but the Johnson supporters
firmly believed " patriotism would array itself with the latter
71
and partisanship with the former". Ordinarily a decision by
the United States Supreme Court is supposed to throw some light
upon the problems with which it deals, otherwise our governmental system does not funation according to its oonstitutiona
basis. In this oase, such dec•sions had little weight with the
67.
~·
68. Hariers
Weekly, June 2, 1866.

69.
70.
71.

tbl •
The Baltimore Sun, May, Zl, L866.
rill.

L

congressmen.

An

example was given when Justice Nelsoa of the

supreme Cout rendered his decision in the Egan Case of 1866.
Judging from the following words, this decisi&n was quite definitely in favor of Johnson's plan:- " Indeed, the moment the
rebellion was suppressed, the ancient authority, possession
'72
and laws resumed their accustomed sway". Now with this decision , the opinion of Stevens, Sumner,and others that Southern
states had forfeited all their rights fell completely to the
ground.
These leaders in Congress looked upon the South as conquered territory, and the use of the negro as the main fruit
of emancipation. According to woodrow Wilson, "the negro became to them a creature who heeded only liberty to make him a
73
man"•••••"They let their sentiment and their sense of power
'74
dictate their thought and purpose". In April,l866, after Congress passed the Civil Rights Bill over the President's veto,
they also sent the Fourteenth Amendment to the States, " as if
less confident of their constitutional ground than of their
'15

parliamentary supremacy". First of all, any Southern State
that reJeoted it was denied admission to the Union, and second
ly subJected to a loss of representative power because of denial of suffrage to the negro. rt·is no wonder that
72. Ibid,June 4,1866.
73. Wilson, Vol. v. p.22.
'74. Ib14.
'75. fila •• p.aa.

Ju. Johnso
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-58expressed his opinion against such a move, but some of the
opposition said, "there is nothing in it which is not strictly
in consonance with Mr. Johnson's views, so we hope, for the
76

sake of harmony, he will not oppose it"."We can see no purpose
in opposition unless to reiterate

~is

conviction that no amend

menta shall be passed until the unrepresented states are ad77

mitted".

Any attempt to compromise or use conciliatory meth-

ods was condemned and the question was asked; "Is the President to be supported because he is the ohampion of conciliation and peace? Congress believes that his conciliation is the
compromise of vital principles, and his

peaoe~s

78

surrender of

human rights". The final radical suggestion as a conclusion to
all this was for "Congress by a joint resolution of both
79

Houses to call upon the President to resign". Impeachment was
the solution advocated by radical journals during June and
July of 1866.
Pro~Johnson

sentiment, however, was not lacking and

~

Baltimore Sun ran an article on "The Deceptive Constttutional
SCI
Amendment". WThis amendment (Fourteenth) aims at deluding
the people, while avoiding the appearance of a conflict with
76. Har~ers Weeklz, June 23,186i.
7'1. Ibi , JUly 1, l86i.
78. ~Atlantic Monthll, April, 1866.
79. The dhicj!o ~alll !ribune, JulJ 19, 1866.

so.

The Bait more sun, June !6, 1866.

L

Johnson. It is artfUlly framed to effect the purposes
axtreme Radicals in Congress and creates a
righ~

and wrong between

itsel~

gul~

ot

the

as wide as

81
and Andrew Johnson's policy".

In the opinion of The New Yorl:;, World, "the President's chief
82

mistake"at this crucial time was not so much in his opposition
83

to the amendment as in"keeping the Cabinet of Mr. Lincoln".

Evidence is quite plain that people recognized this lack of
harmony in the Cabinet and that his friends urged a change.
Henry J. Raymond stood b7 the President in proclaiming that

"we sustain, thoroughly and heartily,the position of the Presi84

dent upon this subject".

Above all, said !he New York Times,

"the people want the Union restored, and in our opinion will
85

send members to the next Congress who will restore it".
Southern viewpoints

nat~ally

did not appease the appetite

of eager politicians sinee they offered opposition to complete
control of the South. one paper said, "we did not

figh~

five

years for the negro. Restore the Union and the negro will
find his proper place under the protection of those most deepl
86

interested in his welfare".

The whole South had gone to work

with zeal, and Kentucky papers urged a persistent campaign for
financial power as the only means of reviving Southern life.
81. Ibi,.
82. The New York world, June 16, 1866.
83. !bll.
8~. The New York Times, June 9, 1866.
85. !bi(.
.
86. ~Lexington Observer and Reporter, August 29, 1866.

-60The remarks made were undoubtedl7 quite tactless, and worked
against amnesty on the part of Congress. However, some of the
harshness of these statements was caused by the truth that was
in them. For example, The LexiD§tOn Observer and Reporter suggested a hope that by a few years of persistent industry the
"silver stolen by Butler,furniture burned by Sherman, and cost
87

ly books captured by pious chaplains could be replaced".

One event whioh tended to give further stimulus to antisouthern feeling was an outbreak in New Orleans. This received
wide publicity throughout the nation, since the event centered
around General Butler, who was located there, and offered an
opportunity to demand something more of the South. First of all
the Northern press declared that a white man fired the first
shot, and that the mayor, an appointee of Johnson, sided with
the mob. The

~ation

summarized the whole affair by calling

Johnson's dispatch to the Louisiana Attorney-General as "disgraceful", and added that " any reconstruction that does not
secure for Wendell Phillips the power of delivering one ot his
most radical lectures in any town ot village of the South,
with complete security, must be a mookery,a delusion, and a
88

snarer General Grant had faced the South on the field of
battle, and now in testifying as the reconstruction of this
""""''

same area saidt "The South is anxious to return under a
87. Ibid., September 5, 1866.
Nation, August E, 1866.
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course which was not humiliating to them as

89

citizens"~

Not

many citizens of the South could have listened to Wendell
Phillips' most radical lectures and upheld respect for themselves, to sat little of avoiding humiliation. It had been
stated before this time that "Wendell Phillips is a man whose
mission is to oppose everything; he first opposed slavery,
then President Johnson, and among other things he occassionall
90

opposes himself." The National Intelligencer said, "we are no
advocates of vengeance. America can afford to for,ive the
91
South for this riot and forget Ben Butler".
Our Chief Executive felt that an appeal to the people might

prevent Congress from securing a radical majority. To aoaomplish this purpose a tour was planned. The immediate occasion
for it was an invitation from Chivago asking the President to
deliver an address at the laying of the corner-stone for a
monument to Stephen A. Douglas. During the preceding year,
William Cullen Bryant declared, "Johnson was proving himself
one of the most discreet, clear-sighted, upright, and saga92
oious statesmen of the age". This type of sentiment was not
present in 1866 when the tour began, but Johnson at least had
prospects of making an appeal. Henry Raymond

said~

we believe

89. The Baltimore Sun, June 21, 1866.
90. !he few !ork Her&ld, June 2, 1866.
91. !he latlonal Intelligenoer, June 29, 1866.
92. The lew York Evening~ost, June 20, l866.(quoted, Milton)
p.220.
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both the President and the country will be benefited by the
tour. We think it would be an excellent thing to follow this
to~

93

by another through the Southern States". One aspect of

.

never-failing importance for Johnson's day was the presence of
opposition in the religious press of America.

ft

The Boston

Transcript said that, "the religioul press of America now
94

unanimously condemned Mr. Lincolnts apostate successor".

One encouraging fact for the President was the support of
friends who upheld him in his plan of reconstruction. Thomas
Ewing of Ohio, a leader of the lhio baz, had supported the
President f'rom the beginning of his administration. He and
Lewis D. Campbell had fought for control of Republican State
conventions since 1865, against Ben Wade, Ashley, Giddings

95

and others destined later to be quite radical in their Yiews.
:Mr.

Ewing issued a statement in the Baltim8re Sua in support

of Johnson on August 14, 186i, which came at & time when sound
logical support was badly needed if the speaking tour was to
mean anything. Ewing declared,"Congress itself is unconstitutional. Therefore the Civil Rights Bill, Freedmens Bureau
96

Bill and Fourteenth Amendment are unconstitutional." This
argument of Mr. Ewing was based upon the fact that Southern
States were out of the Union while-national legislation was
93. The New York Times August 20, 1866.
94. Tne Boston Transcript, August,20, 1866.
95. ii!ton, P• 2!1.
96. ~he Baltimore Sun, August 14, 1866.
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enacted, and included the pertinent remark that, "exclusion is
necessary only to retain power in the hands of the present
97

majority".

Across the Atlantic, French newspaper opinion spoke
ly of Johnson. An editorial in LaLiberte said:

n

f'avorab~

THis Presi9

dent Johnson has become a most devoted agent of reconciliation.
He really was attempting to complete restoration despite
severe opposition, and with his proclamation restoring civil
authority in Texas,the Union was completed. The Baltimore Sun
stated, wthere is but one other step now necessary at the
hands of the Executive, and that is to remove all restrictions
99

from the proclamation of Amnesty". This would ha.a been very
well, providing the Executive could exert authority enough to
accomplish such a purpose. The necessary move now was to influence public opinion sufficiently to secure a friendly

Con~

gress.
Publio speaking had been costly to Johnson prior to this,
and now he was in tremendous danger of saying many things to
antagonize people, especially when influenced by feeling more
than by logical thinking. Mr. Godkin thought w he is either
under W%etched advisers or is himself unmanageable. His speech

1oa

es are vulgar, egotistical, and sometimes profane". The only
97. Ibid., August 14,1866.
98. Ibid.; August 24,1866.
99. Ibid., August 20,1866.

100. !he Nation, September 6, 1866.

L

mitigating circumstance in Mr. Godkin's criticism was an
apology for using such harsh terms, but as he explained,"these
harsh words were necessary after a careful reading of the
101
speeohes". Harpers Weekly defied any man to "read the speeche
lo2
uttered by the President without wincing with mortification".
Chicago's welcome was not at all enthusiaatia, according to
The Chioyo Daily lribune,but "may be likened to a frost in
midsummer, killing flowers and casting gloom over the face of
103
Nature". The New York Observer upheld Johnson, but on September,20,regretted to say that " President Johnson's style
has often been such as to sadden and even mortify national
104
pride". This newspaper then continued to uphold him by criticising the people for according him such a poor welcome. "H1a
reception in some of the places is deserving of severest repro105
bation". Sumner's paper said the speeches were,"unsurpassed
106
for shallowness", and th&S the " President chose to leave the
1o7
Capital and become a stump orator or demagogue". In his
108
speech at Cleveland he remarked," I do not care about dignity".
His friend, Mr. Raymond could only say he "greatly regretted
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
lOS.

Ibid.
H&rPers Weekly, September 22, 1866.
!he chlc~o Dailf ~ribune, September 7, 1866.
The New ~rk wor a, september 20, 1866.

fbi!.

~Boston

fbid.

Transcript, August 30, 1866.

!ie New York Times, September 7, 1866.
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109
suoh a remark".

-15-

Down in Kentuoky the visit was

~ailed

as "the most remark-

able official tour in our history. The Radioals have shown an
utter want of decenoy in their

treat~ent

'

of him during a

time like this when Courage and Truth are aore preoioua 'than
110
dignity". The Baltimo•e Sun looked upon the President as "no
111
polished orator, but an earnest man". Furthermore, acoording
to this paper even though his speeches were at times ra.ther
impassioned, " he gave a oonolusive answer to the unscrupulous
112
enemies of restoration". A s~a.ry of the Baltimore speeoh
inoludes some salient arguments of the President. The South
fought because the North in its estimation, endangered the
Constitution. fhey did not fight against the Constitution, but
against a Union they thought

bro~e

the Constitution. After

being oompelled to lay down arms, "the South is now as firmly
113
for the Constitution as always". The Baltimore Sun oalled
114
this last remark the " oorner-stone of his speech".
Whatever else may be said, it must he admitted that Andrew
Johnson made a 4esperate effort to bring back the Southern
States without having negro suffrage teraed upon them. Nothing
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Ibid.
The Lexington Observer and Reporter, September 15,1866.
The B&ltimore Sun, September !, 1866.
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proves this any more than persistent criticism by the radical
exponent of negro suffrage, The Chicago Daill Tribune, which
stated that, "for MZ. Johnson longer to persist in his attempt
to restore the Rebels to power without such guarantees as the
publie sentiment demands, would be to defy and insult the
American people in a manner requiring more turpitude than even
115
Andrew Johnson has yet displayed"• Apparently these guarantees
that publio sentiment demanded amounted to nothing more than
negro sutfrage, and this was definitely statel when The Baltimore Sun remin4ed people; " One single act remains to be donethe admission of representatives, but the separation party
has entrenched itself behind the proposed amendment, negro
116
suffrace. "
Radical leaders were quite busy while the tour was being
made. Ben Butler spoke in Cleveland and informed the audience
there that

Johnson has filled thirty offtces now without
117
Senate concurrence. The Senate is already deprived ot its righ
118
Thaddeus Stevens called the entire affair"A circus". ~
~.

Nation probably gave Stevens too much credit by "deploring
his oratory for the same reason he indulged in it-- tor the
119
sake of the cause". Stevens had only one cause now, and that
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

The Chicago Daily Tribune, October ll, 1866.
The Baltimore Sun, September 24, 1866.
The Nation, October 4, 1866.

Ibid.
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was Republican domination by a Republican Congress. The evidence lies in his speeohes and attitude towa.rd Johnson, together with the way in which legislation was engineered by his
Reconstruction

Commit~ee.

New England opposition to the South was bitterly resented.
The LeXington Observer and Reporter openly stated: •It may be
taken

~or

granted that so long as the New England &ligarohy

continues to control the public sentiment, Kentucky and the
South will be excluded from a share in the Federal Government.
wendell Phillips declares there oan be no lasting peace until
South Carolina, Louisiana and Kentucky are born again in the
image of Massaohusetts.

Bew England civilization stands ready

120

to throttle us".

Some of the fruite of his February twenty-seaond speech
eame before Mr. Johnson as John

w.

Forney attempted to create

opposition to him by using his Washington Chronicle for that
purpose. Mr. Forney answered Thomas Ewing's appeal tp the
Constitution in favor of Johnson by quoting from a speech the
latter made in Nashville, Tennessee, in 1864. "Whenever you
find a man prating about the Constitution--- spot him; for he
121
is a traitor". lmny of these editorial discussions had been
made with pro-Johnson papers, and The Baltimore Sun, which
120. The
121. The

Lexi~ton

wash~ton

Observer and Reporter, November 21, 1866.
ebion!cle, ootober 5, 1866.
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printed Mr Ewing's article, had given a fairly good answer to
Forney's thrust in an eulier issue. "Isolated facts and

incom~

pleteness is a wanton thing when generalizations are made from
thea. We shall never prepare accounts to serve the corrupi
122

purposes of a faction".

However, the

No~thern

people who read

The WashiASton Chronicle saw there a oomplete denunciation of
the President not based entirely upon isolated facta.

~o

ever favors President Johnson, wishes to strip the l6yal North
of twenty-five members in Congress, and give twenty-five seats
123

to the disloyal South".(:The President's Journal in Washington
tried to overcome this, and urged people to "remember that the
124

plan ot the President rests upon Constitutional government".

We are brought back at this time to a former reference made
to Andrew Johnson's nomination for Vice-President. Charles
Sumner gave a speech in Washington D.C., early in October, 1866
in which he called Johnson "a creature of an accident, and in125

ferior in ability and character".

Mr. Sumner referred to the

immediate cause of Johnsonts acoession,whioh was an accident,
but did not mention the political battle at Baltimore, June7,
1864, in which his political designs against Seward fesulted
126

in

Johnson's nomination.
Meanwhile as the

election~·approached,

more radioal state-

122. The Baltimore Sun, September 7, 1866.
123. The WiShl~on chronicle, oetober 4, 1866.

124. The
125.
126.

Natlo~ Inte!Il~enoer,

Ibid., October 4, 18 6.

~is,

Chapter I, p.l.

September 13, 1866.

r
-69ments were made on both sides. The Chicago Times, a Democratic
journal,

~gested

a hasty and decisive method. "An industri-

ous and energetio application of the guillotine is all that is
127
need.ed to remove the Republican Jarty and save the country".
This journal went further into the administration and gave
some comparisons of prominent men. "If there is a worse man in
the United States than Ben Butler, that man is Edwin M. Stanton. Only those aapa•le of analyzing deliberate remorseless
scoundrelism aan understand the aharaater of either of these
128
wretches". More light was thrown upon the New Orleans riot
by telling how General Baird sent a telegram to Stanton. Stanton placed it in his pocket and did not say a word concerning
it unitl a week after the riot, and then, before informing the
129
President as to its contents, sent it to the press. This type
of journal was branded as

1

Copperhead', and did not succeed in

exerting enough influence to save many votes for Johnson's
support in the autumn elections.
People in the seceded area had very little confidence in
political aid and frankly admitted it. There plans turned to
industrial and oommeroial welfare as the only means of rega.ining prestige. The Lexington Observer and Reporter thought,
"if the South could make herself rich and prosperous she could
127. The Chioago Times, October ll, 1866.
l28t tbta~. lovember Ia, 18&6.

129. Ilil!.

-
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130

secure every political right she desired". An editorial statement like this is

~uite

prophetic and true to later develop-

ments, as we shall aee from the following words ot Frederic L.
Paxson

~itten

in 1915,"The tuture ot American politics atter

1865 was·largely determined by the methods by which the revenue had been increased. It was a prosperous Union that emerged
trom the Civil War and every region but the South was strong
131

in its conscious wealth".

In addition to the economic motive,

the south saw how people of the North supported Congress, and
thereto•• prepared tor the worst. !he Chic!So Times said Congress quite obviously meant to carry measure to an extreme,and
&dded," the South may expect more degrading conditions than
132

those heretofore offered".

Interpretations of the radical victory were immediately
forthcoming as an aftermath of the elections to Congress. .........
The
Atlantic Monthly remarked, "the controversy has been disposed

ot by the people. The high reconstruction powers which Johnson so h&ughtily,ostentatiously and confidently claimed have
been disallowed, denounced and utterly repudiated, while those
133

of congress have been confirmed"•

Mr. Raymond held out one

ray of hope and did not desert Iohnson when he wr•te in .........
The
New York Times:-"If the President will consent to retrace his
130. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, December 5, 1866.
131. Paxson, p.
132. The Lexi:fton Observer and Reporter, December 5, 1866.

Io.

13~.

!he Itlan 1a Monthly, December, 1866.

-flsteps a little, it will not be difficult for him to present a
plan which will oomman4 the respect and the sanction of the
134

great maJority of American people•" A hope of this nature was
too idealistic to be of any value under the circumstances, but
it is encouraging to see a more careful analysis of events as
given in lhe Baltimore Sun." The results plainly show that the
Northern States declare in favor of more stringent measures
135

of reconstruction than those of the President".

The Baltimore

Sun did not believe the maJority ot Northern people would require negro suffrage "because nearly all Northern Sta.tes deny
136
suffrage to their negroes". The last argument must have struck
Northern leaders as quite true but decidedly impractical. At
any rate, the elections were no direct indorsement of Ben
Butlets impeachment program except insofar as they gave the
Radicals enough votes to earry this out if lesirable. There
was really no contest now, for the force was too mnch on one
side. "Surely no public man ever encountered such sudden and
137

bitter retribution".

Retribution was not completed, however,

until iapeachment was attempted, so 1866 closed with the
President facing impeachment.
134.
135.
136.
13,,

The New York Times, November 19, 1866.
!he !&l'timore SUii , December 4, 1866.
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Uii;pera weekly, December 22, 1866.

There is no assurance that Congress would have been satisfied to admit the Southern St&tes with no other guarantee than
the acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Oberholtzer
says, "if ever there had been a time when Congress might have
been contented with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
as a condition upon which the Southern States might return to
1

their Federal relationships, it had now passed". This was
blamed upon Andrew Johnson in a speech made by James A. Garfield, who stated that "if the President had on any day since
last July advised the people of the South to accept the Constitutional Amenlment (Fourteenth) and come in as Tennessee
2

did, it would have been done". Mr. Garfield's assurance of
such return is further substantiated by George

w.

Julian's be-

lief; "If the Fourteenth Amendment had been at first accepted,
the work of reconstruction would have ended without conferring
the ballot upon the negro. This will scarcely be denied by
anyone, and has been frankly admitted by some of the most dis3

tinguished leaders of the party".
Southern people recognized this, as may be seen in the
statement from the Lexington Observer and Reporter that "the
great majority are bent on enfranchisement of blacks, together
4

with the disfranchisement of rebel whites". Furthermore,this
1.
2.
3.
4.

Oberholtzer, Vol. v. p. 425.
Rhodes, Vol. VI. p.5.
Julian, p. 304.
The Lexin ton Observer and Re orter,January 2, 1867.

-73paper added that " Congress is supported by twenty dominant
states, flushed with victory, and anxious to insult and pro5

scribe ten or eleven enfeebled states". This humiliation was
magnified through a suspicion that even if the amendments were
accepted, there would be no reliet or escape from vindictive

s.

measures. George

Shanklin, Congressman from Lexington,Ken-

tucky, sa•d," not one fourth of the Radicals are in favor of
admitting Southern states even if they do ratify the Thir6

teenth Amendment". Sectionalism was entirely too noticeable in
this suffrage drive to permit the use of much New England religious protection, or of very much patriotic appeal. There
was eonsiderable talk in papers throughout the land about the
crime of rebel leaders and the terrible depravity of slavery,
but The Chicago Daill Tribune was the only Journal that had
developed the idea to such an extent as t6 claim it would be
easier to educate the four million negroes for citizenship
than to attempt a return of the rebel whites.
Congress started out bf presenting a bill to the President
granting negro suffrage in the District of Columbia. Charles
Sumner was the guiding hand of this measuee, and he presented
it to the Senate before that body was in session an hour. It
was approved in less than a fortnight, and the House pass-ed.' ·
5. Ibid., January 9, 1867.
6. !Dtr., January 2, 1867.
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it with prompt decision on the :following day, December,l4,
7

1a66. On January 4,la67, Johnson read his veto message on the
bill, in a Cabinet meeting,a:tter which Edwin M. Stanton took
from his portfolio a brief, and carefUlly expounded his approv
al o:t the bill. He could see no Constitutional objections to
it, and therefore urged the President to sign it. Welles objected quite strenously to Stanton's argument, and admits he

a

"expected that Stanton would be defiant", but the latter "said
9

not a word". General Grant was present at the Cabinet meeting,
by invitation, and was very emphatic in his ttatements against
the bill because w he thought it a very contemptible business
:tor memhers of Congress whose states excluded negroes, to give
10
them suffrage in this district". Attorney-General Stanberry
thought the Supreme Court would probably declare against such
a measure, but the immediate occasion demanded action, so
Johnson expressed his opinion in a veto.
Immediately upon receipt of the veto, Congress listened to
speeches for several hours, and then proseeded to pass the
bill over Johnson's veto. Acoording,to Oberholtzer, "the
negro had been .rp.ade the peer of the white man at the ballot
box in that domain of the United States under direct Congress7. Oberholtzer, Vol. I. p.l43.
a. Welles, Vol. III. P.4.
9 • Ibid • , p • 5 •
10. !bid.

11
ional control". No time was taken for any reconsideration of
the measure, and it was passed with such 4ecisive force that
no one could doubt the power Of the legislative branch over
any executive veto. Johnson's message vetoing the bill was a
"clear, compact argument against a moat unwise and unjust meas12

ure", said The National Intelligencer. The Chicago Daily
Tribune could stand no interference whatever, aad argued that
" Mr 9 Johnson thinks Congress ought not to attempt to frustrate
13

his attempts to carry on the government". Of course, this
argument

s~oed

now, because the mass of people had repudi-

ated Johnson at the polls, aad had given evidence that they
saw things in practically the same light.
Congress had one more branch of the united States to deal
with before becoming absolutely supreme. This was the Supreme
court. That Tribunal created a considerable amount of turmoil
by the decision handed down in the Milligan case.

~is

was

published December 17, 1866, and newspapers were filled with
it during the early part of January, 1867. The Supreme Court
ruled that neither the President nor Congress had the power
to

martial law, and to authorize the trial of a oiti14
zen by mililtuy tribunals where the civil courts were openl ~
deo~are

Exoitmment man high in Congress!f and -especially among those
11. Oberholtzer, Vol. I, P• 425.
12. The National Intellifenoer, January 8, 1867.
13. The chio;go Daily Tr bune, January 9, l8i7.
14. Rho4ea,

ol. VI, p. 13

.
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in opposition to Johnson. On January 10, 1867, The Nation
talked of iapeaching the judges. Coercion seemingly had become a Congressional policy, and if any power stood in the way,
15
impeachment was declared necessary. Rhodes says the chief
reason for causing Congress to be thrown into the hands of
Radicals was the almost unanimous rejection of the Fourteenth
16

Amendment by Southern States. His statement only substantiates
an already evident fact that negro suffrage was paramount.
Whatever discussion may be raised over suffrage, those opposed
to Johnson were equally convinced of a breach of :faith, not
only in executive, but now in juducial circles. The

Chic~o

Daill Tribune remarked, "we cannot rely upon the Judicial
Depaitment of our government to cooperate in securing the
17
fruits of a hard-earned victory over the rebels." "Copperhead" opinion expressed hope in recent decisions o:f the Supreme Court, because it was intimated that " the vtto power,
however wisely exercised, is no restriction upon corrupt,
18
vicious or unconstitutional legislation". The excitement
aroused over Supreme Court activities shows quite clearly what
Congress would demand, and it likewise tends to show that
Andrew Johnson, with all his mistakes, did not necessarily
bring all his troubles upon himself.
15. The Nation, January 10, 1867.
16. tliia.
17. ~Chicago Daily Tribune, January 15, 1867.
18. The Chicago Times, January, 9, 1867.

L
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Radical Journals could usually bring forth abundant arguments in support ot their case, and Mr. Lincoln was once more
used as proof against the new autocrat, the United States
Supreme Court. Lincoln said, "the candid citizen must confess
that if the policy of our government upon vital questions
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fised by supreme Court decisions, then the instantt these questions are
given to the Cpurt, the people sign their government into the
19
.
hands of that eminent tribunal". A remedy was suggested by
following the precedent ot earlier years, and The Chic!6o
Daily Tribune used the following example;"

~he

Supreme Court,

many years ago, decided that the United States Bask was Constitutional, but the people, taking a different view, decided
20
otherwise, and the charter was not renewed". Gideon Welles
had reasons to see the possibility of a fundamental change in
our government, and stated; "We are living in a revolutionary
period, and the character of the government is undergoing a
21
strain whivh may transform it into a different character".
While historians to not deal much with impeachment at this
particular period, the people throughout America were reading
it almost every day in some of the laading Journals. The Boston Transcript busied itself with a discussion of how many
19. The Chicago Dail~ Tribune, January 17,1867.
20. Ibid., January I , 1867.
21. li!Ies, Vol. III. P.l7.
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Johnson had oalled Congress a disloyal body, and by

heaping criticism upon Gileon Welles, who persisted in support
ing the Exeo•tive. It was said that Welles had been dismissed
from the Navy Department some years before as an inoompetent
assistant. Impeachment had developed to the point where some
were wondering whether to suspend Johnson immediately after
impeachment, and thereby deprive him of power, or to wait for·
the Senate trial to be completed. Intensity of publio feeling
22

was given as a good reason for waiting on the trial. Henry J.
Raymond of lhe New York Times admitted, "if it is the determination of two or three members of the House to carry out a
ooncooted scheme of impeachment, then the subJect so far as
23

the House is concerned may be considered settled in advance".

Some hope was held out for Johnson because it was thought the
issue would most likely never be pushed to the extremity.
Henry J. Raymond said," The general sentiment of the country
is already pretty distinctly pronounoed against the whole
24

proJect of impeachment•" The Boston Transcript, while zealously advocating impeachment gives a good idea of the main obstacle. "The Constitution is very plain on the subject of ia25
peachment, and yet the people seem not to understand".
22. The Chic~o Daily Tribune, January 18, 1867.
23. The New ork Times, January 8, 1867.
24, Ib1(., January 15, 1867.

25. The Boston TransoriRt, January 25, 1867.

-79E.L. Godkin discussed this problem in several issues of
The Nation, and while condemning the President for his speeches and vetoes, admitted that impeachment was no remedy for the
situation, He said," His sophistry is of the half-simple kind,
like smart young men who sharpen their wits by debating on the
26

worst side". Nevertheless,impeaohment appeared to him to be
a much greater evil than Johnson's continuance in oftice, as
is shown in the following remazk:- " Mr. Johnson is a very
narrow-minded person, who has concluded that;he is the government, and the sole business of Congress is to vote money or
27

care for details", yet his impeachment,we believe,n will be a
great and lasting calamity unless far worse offenses are com28

mitted". The Nation

concluded that besides arousing much

hatred and spending money, the chief results of an impeachment would be " a vast increase in the consumption of whiskey
29
and the use of profanity".
Thaddeus Stevens claimed the South had been in a state of
anarchy aow for two years, Therefo2e, circumstances demanded
immediate action, and true to many indiGations in editorials
prior to this, he demanded complete enfranchisement of the
blacks in all parts of the South. The plan he prepared was
26. The Nation , January 10, 1867.
27. Ib14.
28. YD!l., January 17~ 1867.
29. !'6I1'.
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read in the House on January 3,1867, and then went to the Reconstruction Committee, where it was made into a formal bill
30

31

on February 6• Some called it "hotch-potch legislation", and
others thought "it cannot be possihle that the intelligent
masses of our countrymen will long submit to be mislead by
32

such transparent partisan artifices". The Lexington Observer
and Reporter said, " It is a highhanded aot of tyranny; pure,
33

unadulterated military despotism". Mr. Rhodes maintained that
"Stevens carried his bill through an unwilling House;

a strong

minority of his own party was opposed to it largely for the
34

reason that pure military rule was unpalatable". Opinion expressed by lhe Boston Transcript exalts Congressional leadership in the folaowing way:- " It is to the credit of the present Congress that great questions are so well discussed, and
35

matters treated with such statesman like ability", and added
" the members of Congress represent the great dominant senti36

ment of loyal people in regard to the late rebellion". Judging
from James G. Blaine's account of the Congressional debates
the question was well discussed,

b~t

after potent remarks were

30. Oberholtzer, Vol. I. pp. 429-430.
31. The New York World, February 22, 1867.
32. The National rntel1igencer, January 25, 1867.

33. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, February 9,1867.

34. Rhodes, Vol. VI. p.l4.
35. The Boston

January 30, 1867.
867.

Transori~t,

36. Ibid., February 6,

l

-simade, the same men who made them were impotent in attempting
37
to stop Stevens. ~.• Raymond,editor of The New York Times,
opposed the bill in a vigorous speech and ended by saying," because we cannot devise anything of a civil nature adequate to
the emergency, it is urged that we must fly to the most violent
38

measure the ingenuity of man can devise". General Garfield
declared that the South had been given plenty of time to act,
and they had acted by returning the Fourteenth Amendment with
contempt. George Boutwell's remarks are interesting when compared with writings of later years. He said, " there are eight
million people writhing under cruelties and injustices because
39
of EKeoutive favors toward rebellious states". Juhn w. Burgess
called the entire Reconstruction Act " the most brutal proposition ever introduced into the Congress of the united States
40
by a responsible committee". Congress could see grave disorders in the South so long as political authority was uncertain there, but after this was granted, nothing was done to
prevent a period of outrageous government, unsurpassed in the
history of our country. Chicago's "Copperhead" journal paid
a tribute to Stevens over thls bill in the following way:-

"Mr.
and

Thaddeus Stevens, that pure and immaculate patriot, lofty
uncorruptible statesman, that cloven-footed representative

37. James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Comgress,Norwich,Connecticut, 1886, p.254.
38. Ibid.
39. !O!a.
(New York,l907) p.ll4.
40. 17W7 Burgess,Reconstruction and the Constitution,

r
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41

of Hell 1 s disorders, is about to open our eyes".

A Northern journal expressed indignation that the Chief
Executive should have vetoed the Reconstruction Bill when "the
distinguishing of it is the employment of military power in
the interest of right and justice". rrot only that,but "the
President had the meanness and effrontery in his veto message
to say the negroes do not want to vote, and that the bill it42

self is almost an excuse for secession". Blaine reports that
James A. Garfield made the following utterance in c•ngress
while debating the Reconstruction Bill:-" I want this Congress
to

giv~

its command to the President of the united States,

and then perhaps, some impeachment hunters will have a chance
43

to impeach him. They will if he does not obey". A survey ••
editorials includes the varying mpinion quite well. E.L. Godkin Joined Garfield in his impeachment remarks in the

be~ief

that " unpunished nullification of the Congressional Acts
44

would be as evil as impeachment".

Therefmre, all that would

save Johnson was complete submission to Congress, and a steady
effort to exeoute the Military Act properly. The righteous
indignation of Northern joUrnals shows too well that such
indignation is not the result of honest thinking among politicians. and their supporting newspapers.
41. The Chic!8o Times, January 22,1867.
42. The Boston Transcri~t, March4, 1867.
43. Blaine, Vol.II, P•

59.

44. The Nation, March 7, 1867.

1~.

Stevens, who
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later demanded complete confiscation of Southern property,was
now supported in his Military Bill. Johnson's veta was called
" the plea of a dull advocate who has taken a side and not the
words of a statesman who regards only the

45

~ommonwealth".

The Executive's supporters, and also Southern papers expressed little hope of a successful future and Stevens• Reconstruction Bill was called "the greatest insult to common-sense
and so the American people ever offered by a national legis46

lature". In the South, affairs appeared to have settled down
to a grim battle for mere existence. The Lexington Observer
and Reporter thought " patient and unconsenting submission is
the present duty of the South. !he ordeal may be terrible, but
47
compared to the life of the raae or nation, it will ee brief".
Even amomg the Northern supporters, the only hope now was to
" trust that the President will respect the action of Congress
48

as a settlement of the Reconstruction

~uestion".

Congress

thoroughly squelched all consideration of the veto by passing
the Reconstruction Act through both Houses on the same day the
49

President returned it, Maroh2,l867.
In his notorious "Swing-Around-The--Circle", Johnson made
a remark later to be used against him. With regard to Federal
45. Harpers weeklf, March 15, 1867.
46. The Chicago T mea, February 8, 1867.

47. The Lexington Observer and Reiorter, March 13, 1867.
4;8. The New York Times, February 2, 1867.
49. Rhodes, Vol. VI, p. 47.
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office-holders in many positions he said; " God being willing,
I will kiok them out. I will kick them out just as fast as I
50
oan". He had not done this, and McCUlloch declares it is his
chief fault during this crisis of his life that he had not removed some Federal men. MoCullooh says, "forl. the first time in
his life, he manifested indecision, and when he did act, he
51
acted unwisely". Johnson was under pressure from some of his
friends to make

a complete

change of Cahinet. Francis P. Blair

plead for a complete change of persomnel, and thought " no
one oould refuse to aid in the effort to lift the

govg~n~ent

above revolutionary factions to save the Constitution". Congress used the loosely spoken words of Johnson as one proof of
a need to protect Federal office-holders. A law was passed
which prevented him from doing what he should have done long
before this time and his usual habit of speaking loosely only
added to the downfall.
Editorial writing plainly indicates that there was nothing
to do now but execute the requirements of Congressional
53
Reconstruction. One man was more responsible for this,perhaps,
than any other in the Cabinet, and that man was Edwin M.
Stanton, Secretary of War. Time after time his opposition had
been proved and clearly shown against the Executive Plan.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Oberholtzer, Vol. I. p.437.
McCulloch, p. 391.
Milton, p.386.
Thesis, p.7 (notes, 45-46, Chapter I.)

He wrote the third Reoonstruotion Act whiah pas~ed over John54
son's veto, July 19,1867, and argued strenously against Johnson's veto of the Distriot of Columbia Suffrage Bill. Welles
brands him as an opponent, and proves that he had started
planning against Presidential Reoonstruction before Lincoln's
55
.
death. It is not neoessary here to prove that he was guilty
o~

malevolent deoeit or gross faults of any nature. McOullooh

says quite plainly that it was an agreement from the wery
beginning of Johnson's administration that eaoh Cabinet member
was to give his services " untf.l the President saw fit to dis56

pense with them". This was not only a gentlemen's agreement
made at the first meeting with Mr. Johnson, but it was also
the reoognized precedent of Executive authority in our national government. If

a President finds his Secretary of War "bold,
57

resourceful and defiant," with regard to his fundamental plans,
he oertainly is under no obligation to submit his entire
authority in order to save that individual a plaoe in the Cabinet.
Congress plaoed an obstaole in the way of suoh ohange by
passing a Tenure-of-Office-Act on Maroh 2, 1867, whioh required the

o~nsent

of the Uhited)States Senate in dismissing

54. John Spenoer Bassett, A Short History of the United States
New York,l92!,p.6l!.
55. Thesis, Chapter I
56. MoCullooh, p. 376.
57. Bassett, p. 611.
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a Cabinet officer. Arguments in behalf of this measure were
nothing short of ludicrous. The Chicago Daily Tribune argued
tt

that there was never a time more auspicious than the present
for suoh a bill as this. It lifts Federal men from dependency
58

and assure them of work. Above all, it is no party measure".
If these arguments weee

basioa~ly

sound, then the Tenure-of-

Office-Act was a sort of Civil Servioe Reform, but it appears
tha.t it did not pl'oduoe quite that effect in giving securi t7
to Federal men. The Nation

held that " the Tenure-of-Offioe

bill is one of the most valuable of those oaused by Mr. Johnson's folly. Its enactment with or without

.z.

Johnson's

59

signature is now assured, fol' which we l'ejoice"• An inevitable
struggle and it was now possible to openly insult the President, break the established precedent foroe him to retain
Cabinet officers against his will, or even impeach him.
Since Reconstruction was working so powerfully through the
halls of Congress, Thaddeus Stevens decided to advocate confiscation of property in the South. A proposal of this type
indicates some of the fundamental patriotism and Constitutional authority upon whioh certain Radicals were working. Journals
friendly to the Ralioals would not uphold suoh a violent
measure. In the opinion of The Nation,,"had anybody proposed
58. The Chioago Daily Tribune, January 21, 1867.
59. The Nation, Febl'uary 1, 1867.

r
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such a bill to the Sultan of Turkey, he would have been expelled as a ruthless visionary. The mere discussion is an
60

affliotion to the country". The Boston Transcript thought,
"Thaddeus Stevens' grand scheme of spoliation by law was more
61

like Genghis Khan or Tamerlane".

Mr.

Stevens, in the face of

such remarks, made a renewed effort, and the Chicago Daill
Tribune offered a real, forceful argument in opposing him.
"The South is already poverty-stricken, with three-fourths of
the live stock killed, money and banks

wiped~out,

fifty per

cent of the young men slain, credit abolished, and nothing but
disorder and chaos is left. No,

1~.

Stevens, Nol The Republic
62

Party's object is first Justice and then Peace".

People of the reconstruction era seemed to be impressed by
arguments brought forth from washington, Jefferson, and other
early Wmerican leaders. Washington's farewell address was
~uoted

in behalf of the South by The Lexington Observer and

REporter." One of the expedients of party government to acquire influence within a particular district is to misrepresen
63

the opinions and aims of other districtsn. Thomas Jefferson
also made some remarks in his first inaugural address whioh
seemed to agree with Southern viewpoints. " The minority
possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect,
60. Ibid., l~ch 21, 1867.
61. ~oston Transcript, May, 29, 1867.
62. The Ofiicago Daily Tribune, November 2, 1867.
63. The texing~on Observer and Reporter, March 6, L867.
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64
and which to violate would be oppression". Southern people
were resigned to the new rule and believed, " the only hope
of the Republic lies in the speedy restoration of the conquered states and the return of a sufficient number of conservative Representatives and Senators to put a check on the
reckless partisan ambitions of the men now holding the reins
65
of power". The oppressive nature of Mr. Steven's work was
recognized by the North as well as by the South, and even by
some Radicals.
Gideon Welles writes on July 17, 1867, that MZ, Stevens
merely sneered at those who held his hills were fundamentally
unconstitutional. Welles aoeused him

of regarding the Consti-

tution as " no more obligatory than the resolutions of last
66
year's Party Convention". " This is the spirit and feeling of
67
the " Great Commoner", the Radical leader". George w, Julian
expresses somewhat the same opinion, and it must be remembered
here that Mr. Julian was a Radical, opposed to the nomination
68
of Lincoln and Johnson, and heartily in favor of negro suff69
rage all through the conflict of reconstruction. He thought
" statesmanship was sacrificed to party management", and that
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Ibid., 1mrch 16, 1867.
The Chicago Times, March 18, 1867.
Welles, v61. III. p. 133.
Ibid.
JU!ran, p. 243.
·
Ibid., chapter 12(entire chapter).
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the Military Bill vetoed by!~. Johnson, was "utterly in70
defensible on principle". " It was complttely at war with the
genius an4 spirit of democratic government. The entire bill
was a conression of Congressional incompetence to deal with a
71
problem which Congress alone had the right to solve". Mr.
Julian contends, along with his fellow Radicals, that Coneress
alone had the right to solve this reconstruction problem, hut
he also admits that Congressional was merely the " abolishment of civil government entirely, and the installation of
72

military power". Later on in his remarks, he shows that his
chief concern was still suffrage, and probably the reason he
said many of these things was because the blacks were not yet
in control of the ballot, as the following statement indicates;
" The Bill was a legislative solecism. It left the ballot in
the hands of white rebels, and did not confer it upon the
73
black loyalists".
Arguments over Constitutional Reconstruction

occupy:~

good-

ly portion of the newspaper editorials theoughout the summer
of 1867. The mass of people had the opportunity to read many
statements of sound thinking, with the usual amount of partisanship thrown in by various papers. Colonel Forney, of the ..
washington Chronicle, in an articie headed " Thaddeus Stevensr
70. Ibid., p.306.
71. 11rQf., p.307.
7 2 • "f6'l(t'.

7 3.

"!'6n'.

-

r
made the prophetic statement "that future generations will
rise up and bless the man,who,opposing a treacherous President,
passed over his vetoes those measures of reconstruction
necessary to secure the results of war and freedom to the peop:.
74

le". The Radical, George

w.

Julian, repudiated such an idea,

and James Ford Rhodes, not a pro-Johnson writer at all, says,
" Stevens obtained his majority for the reconstruction bills
7

by saeaasm, taunts, dragooning, and by cracking the party whip.
Such methods are not necessarily a part of Constitutioaal procedure, but the Northern papers began a campaign to bfand
Johnson's

opposit~&n

to them as contrary to the Constituttnn.

The Chicago Daily Tribune summarized this opinion as follows:" He assumes he is supporting the flag and the Constitution
when he delays and defeats loyal men in the South in their
76
right to vote. The issue was decided in 1866".

Presidential support was sufficient to balance part of this
in the public mind, and at least part of the people saw some
indications that

1~.

Johnson was not destroying the entire

Constitution. The National Intelligencer thought " the most
ludicrous inconsistency observable in the efforts of the handful of Radical agitators is the enfranchisement of aegroes
7

and the disfranchisements of many-Yhites, including
74. The Washington Chronicle, April 18, 1867.

75. anodes, Vol. VI. P• 17.
76. The Chicago Daily Tribune, September 19, 1867.
77. The National Intelligencer, May,l, 1867.

foreigner~
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According to The Lexington Observer and Reporter, " this
faction, having usurped the government, has demoralized the
public sentiment and taught that ab&ve the Constitution is the
78

will of the maJority". It began to be apparent to many that if
the Union was the chief aim and sole obJect of the war, then

t

the prolonged delay in restoring the South was quite a contradiction in itself. The New York World state&, " Tennessee has
been admitted, while other states are held under military
authority. This is perfidy to the states, and a violation of
79

the Constitution".
Northern sympathizers looked upon the Military Bill as an
immense work to be carried out for the good of America.

~

Washington Chronicle decided that, " we must nationalize this
agitation in support of the new Commission to carry out its
80

work. We do this because of principles which are right". All
speeches, appointments and general action of the President
were watched for signs of opposition. In a speech of July 25,
81

he said he would " never willingly execute the law", meaning
the last

~econstruotion

Act. Rumors

also spread abroad that

General Sheridan was to be removed from his command in the
south. His removal was interpreted as " pure spite, the spite
of an obstinate ,aan or a sort of stupid self-assertion of
78. The Lexiygton Observer and Re!orter, April 6, 1867.
79. The New ork World, JUly 12, 867.
so. The Washington Chronicle, April 30, 1867.
81. The Nation, July 25, 18~7.
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Constitutional powers belonging to the President, which, Mr.
82
Johnson conceives, Congress has been encroaching upon". On
July 4, the President made another address which, like most of
those he made, did not fail to make some choice remarks for
the opposition to use against him. He describes his way of
arriving at eoAolusions in politics-- namely, n First of all,
83

be convinced that you are right".

The Radicals met such a

statement by quoting it against the President, and then exp
pressing their intentions of " beginning reconstruction at the
very first stages", and if the delay seems fraught with injury
to the South,n the responsibility for this must fall upon the
President and his rebel cohorts, who have endeavoured to trick
84..

the nation out of its rights".
The impoverished South looked upon these proceedings with
humiliation, but remained helpless to do much to relieve the
situation. There are significant hints as to future developments in the Uhited States in some of the Southern editorials
that are refreshing in the midst of daily slander, criticism,
or disgusting party politics. The opinions stated show a viewpoint and includes all of America and an attempt to see the
nation as a growing power. In the opinion of The Lexington
Observer and Reporter,

n ~he p~an

of the Radicals could never

82. Ibid.
83. ~washington Chronicle, June 25, 1867.
Ibid. ( 84)

r
have been accomplished

b~t

for the active assistance of our

growing North West. Her leading citizens, former New Englan4ers,have control of the new states of the

~orthwest

and led

them in blind submission behind lmssachusetts. The future
destinies a.ee not bound up with New Engla.ad, for the West and r:;
South will be united on the great questions of policy looming
before us. While the others fight over the negro, New England
85
is gathering the rioh spoils of high tariff into her coffers".
The most noticeable change in the editorial support of Johnson during the summer of 1867 i·s the attitude of opposition
taken by Henry J. Raymond in The New York Times. For some
time, this paper had counseled moderation on Johnson's part,
and now that the Reconstruction Acts

~re

United St&tes law,

it was thought to be " a matter of sacred duty that he should
be receptive of the opinions of others, rather than over--tenacious of his own. The President will commit a very grave mistake if he interrupts this steady and acceptable operation of
86
the law". The New York Times editorials make it quite plain
that Johnson must
and adds,

n

carr~

out the entire Congressional program,

neither the President nor anybody else will have

the power, even if he has the wish, to areest the beneficent
87
work the Recoastruction Bill was designed to accomplish".
85. The Lexi~ton Observer and Re~orter, August 14, 1867.
86. The New prk Times~ June 15, 867.
87. fii4., J'\i17 3, 186 •
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The Presidential plan was described as " crude and incomplete",
and even in the execution of the Reconstruction Bill, more
confidence was placed in General Grant than in Johnson. "To
this quarter we look for the· efficiency and peace which are
89

most unwisely denied by President Johnson". " Mr. Johnson's
career during the last few months has shown that he cannot
appreciate moderation, and that forbearance does nothing but
90
feed his arrogance".
Most pt the month of August, 1867, is taken up with the removal of Edwin M. Stanton. Johnson argued that the Tenure-ofOffice-Act " does not apply to Cabinet officers appointed by
91
my predecesso*"· Stanton was accused of " clinging to office
92
like a coward clings to life". The New York World held that
circumstances furnished solid grounds for removal of Cabinet
93
officers, an4 a mandamus would be effective in this case". It
is quite evident that the Tenure-of-Office-Act was not passed
to meet a general need, for " as a matter of fact Johnson has
been far froa free and indiscriminate in the removal of office
holders, even though their antagonism was carried to offensive
94
lengths". McCulloch wrote to Samue~ J. Tilden in October,l866:
" The President desires to make as few changes as possible,
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Ibid., July 27, 1867.

!Dr[., July 31, 1867.

TOri., August 29, 1867.
~New

York World, August 7, 1867.

!bia.
!Dft., August 8, 1867.
McCulloch, p. 377.
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and none on political grounds, unless it was clear that the
interests of the service ot the interests of the administra95

tion are to be certainly benefited by them". E.L. Godkin said,
" the

actionso~ I~.

Johnson towards the Secretary of War afford

no grounds in themselves for vehement censure; but as an indi96
cation of his stubbornness they deserve emphatic condemnation".
The President had waited too long tor this move, and his attempt to remove Stanton in 1867 only made the effort appear to
be obstinacy rather than honest policy. No matter what the
Constitutional grounda were, Johnson failed to use any taot or
decisive action until such action was no longer possible. His
friend,, McCulloch, testifies to this when he says, " Johnson
knew when the Tenure-of.Office- Bill was before Congress that·
the object of its leading supporters was to tie his hands, and
yet he refrained from using them when they were·.,rfree. He manifested weakness and indecision, and when he did aot, he aoted
97
unwisely".
The opposition lost no time in condemning Stanton's removal.
From The Boston Transcript oame the remark, " Johnson has
accomplished one thing by his removal of Stanton; one more
98

revelation of his wrong-headedness". The New York Post called
Stanton " one of the most faithful, capable, upright public
95.
96.
97.
98.

Oberholtzer, Vol. I. P• 438.
The Nation, August 22, 1867.
McdUilooh, p. 391.
The Boston Transcript, August 12, 1867.
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servants this nation has ever had".

99

The President opened the

way for the very thing the Radicals wanted to use as condemnation. By removing Stanton, it appeared

he

was attemptiag to

" modify the effeot of the Reoonstruotion Acts in ohanging the
100
War Department". When the Tenure-of-Office Aot was up before
Congress, editorials in the Ntrth defended it as a muoh needed
reform measure, and oarefully explained how it would benefit
101
our government. The Chicago Daily Tribune offers some interesting explanations concerning the bill,now that it had become a
law, and such remarks could no longer hinder its enactment.
"The Tenure-of-Office Aot was enacted expressly to meet the
perverseness of Andrew Johnson, and probably four-fifths of
those who voted for it believed they were taking measures to
prevent the President from removing Mz. Stanton and filling
102
his plaoe with a rebel sympathizer".
So far

a~

the North was oonoerned, he was displaying a

stubborn insolence in even so much as questioning this measure,
while in the South he appeared to be given to entirely too
muoh delay. A Kentucky journal expressed satisfaotion that"the
President has at last summoned energ·y enough to maintain his
99.The New York Post, New York City, August 12, 1867.
100. The Boston Transcript, August 24, 1867.
101. Thesis, ehapter IV. Notes, 57-58.
102. The Chioago Daily Tribune, August 3, 1867.

r
-9"1-

own authority. Stanton the bully, has been ignominiously ex103
pelled from the Cabinet". This Lexington Observer and Repor~er
upheld Mr. Johnson throughout and its criticism was severe
with regard to Radicals, but the editor gives Edwin M. Stanton
credit, even while rejoicing in his downfall. " Stanton displarsd shrewd percept, knowledge and skill to paralyze the
opposition. He has been overthrown by one his inferior in all
104
save lawful authority". The President created one more available point against himself by suspending M%. Stanton, rather
than removing him. He was then accused o# oraering Stanton's
removal after the Unite4 States Senate had refused to suspend
him, and this opened the way for his impeachment under the
Tenure-of-Office Act. Public opinion in both North and South
was rapidly gaining force against him. Welles shows a more
intimate viewpoint, which the public, however, could not
know or read

fD~

several years. In his diary he tells of a

conversation held with the President on August 5, 1867. In
speaking of Stanton, Johnson remarked: " It is impossible to
get along with such_, a man in such a position, and I can stand
it no longer--- to think that the man whom I have trusted was
105
plotting and intriguing against me".
Some rather interesting political motives appear with regard
103. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, August 17, 1867.
104. !bid.
105. wer!es, Vol. III, P• 157.
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to impeachment during the latter part of 1887. Preceding the
October elections of 1867, The Chicago Daill Tribune constantly harangued Johnson and demanded impeachment. On August 21,

tt published this decisive statement: " The country has endured Andrew Johnson as long as endurance can be ooun ted a
There are reasons in law now, and let Congress put him
106
out". Down to the first Tuesday in October, The Chioago Daily

vi~tue 9

Tribune was almost rabid in ij;s demands for impeachment, and
then, by Deoember 2, 1867, the sentiment had so far ohanged as
to denounce immediate impeachment as " madness and folly
107
sponsored only by men of dwarfed vision". One reason to prompt
suoh a change was a turn toward conservatism as indioated in
108
the fall elections. The Democrats and "Copperheads" also repudiated Johnson at this time, and made him so thoroughly subdued in power that little political harm could result by
leaving him alone, while a great deal might happen if impeaohment proceedings proved a failure.
Three Northern jpurnals summarize4 the opinion in the follo
ing manner. According to The New York Times, " the general
feeling is that Mr. Johnson'e:hands are tied already and the
oountry will outlive his term of office. The removal may be
essential to the success of a Jresidential game, but vital
106. The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 21, 1867.
107. The chicago Times, beoember 2, 1867.
108. oberholtzer, vo!. r. p.479.
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interests of the nation cannot be sacrificed to promote a
l09

faction". The New York World said,

n

by its bold acts, Congres

has virtually passed sentence upon the President, in advanoe o
formal charges,and wmthout evidence. They have taken from him
the command of the army, removal of officers, and demand that
he shall understand t"1e Constitution in the way they choose
110

to put it", while Harpers Weekly deolared," we believe that
public sentiment would justify impeachment, but it is for the
jud.ciary committee to determine whether the case can be pre111

sented so as to make conviction a moral certainty".

A coming Presidential election caused one more change
toward Johnson among Northern journals 9 The Chi•ago Times
turned against him after the October elections of 1867, and
criticised his speeches, motives and general administration.
" The Johnson administration allows demagogues to undermine
the state, the finanoial burdens increase, industry languishes,
ani the Democracy regard Mr. Johnson as responsible to the

people for this state of affaias. He has fallen between two
stools, from whioh awkward situation we do not propose to
rescue himt In his sp,eohes, Mr. Johnson has done nothing but
109.
110.
111.

The New York Times. November 26, 1867.
The New York World, December 9, 1867.
Harpers Weekly, October 5, 1867.
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strengthen the power of the Republicans by exoiting popular
112

contempt for himself". This oaused rejoicing in The Chicago
Daily Tribune oolumns, and according to that paper Johnson was
113

" in the last ditch".

"Andrew Johnson has reached the lowest

depths to which any human being could descend in the estate of
114

mankind:- 'The Copperheads' 1efuse him" 1
Republican papers in the North are in agreement as to the
impeac~~ent

question at the end at 1867, and no matter what aad

been said before, or what actually happened later, editorial
statements are quite definitely against it in December. Henry
Raymond believed, " the country will rejoice at the summary
dismissal of this wild scheme of personal

~alice,

because we

regard the President as beyond the reach of political redemp115

tion, anyhow". And other papers thought, " the impeachment has
never been more than the whim ot a few. It has never been
sanotioned by the intelligent judgment of the oountry, and we
116

do not believe it will be sanctioned by Congress". This statement of Harpers Weekly directly contradicts the opinion published in that same journal on October 2, 1867, when the editor said, " we believe that public sentiment would justify
117

impeaohment",and is one example of the change some journals
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

lhe Chicago Times, October 12, 1867.
The chicago Daily Tribune, November 14, 1867.
Ibid.
The New York Times, December 2, 1867.
Har~ers weekly, December 14, 1867.
!bl ., October 2, 1867.

had made by this time. The Chicago Daily Tribune felt relieved
fhat impeachment charges fell in the first attempt before the
House by a vote of 108 to 57 and added," Thus that source of
mischief falls, to be troublesome no moee, for a few months
will dismiss Mr. Johnson to the obscurity of Tennessee plan118
tation life, whence he ought never to have emerged".
Since the October elections of 1867 showed a decided trend
toward the Democratic party they therefore united Radicals
and Conservatives in Congress in preparation for the Presidential electioa. This effect was diiastrous to the welfare of
Johnson if the Radicals aimed to impeachhhim, and Oberholtzer
aays,"the leaders in the House needed no goadingto arouse
their energiesV Every detail of the plot to place the President in a position from which he could not extricate himself
had been arranged. Stanton had played his part bluffly and
arrogantly, while Grant had become an instrument to serve the
119
party ends". The Nation thought n it was by no means improb120
able that the Democrats might elect their next President".
And such a contingency as that immediately united the Republican ranks. The paramount sentiment now seemed to be cen121
tered on impeac~~ent as a means of saving the party. The twot :..:.i.

thirds majority in Congress was-safe until March 4, 1869, and
118.
119.
120.
121.

The Chicago Daily Tribune, December 9, 1867.
Oberholtzer, Vol. r. p.494.
The Nation, December 9, 1867.
Rhodes, Vol. VI. P• 93.

-10£" in the mean time it must be used so that a Republioan President should be eleoted in 1868. There was no thought ot tUl'n122
ing baok as a response to pub11o sentiment".
122.

~.,

p. 94.

-103aHAPTER V
Reconst~uction

not only a

following the

resto~ation

Civil War included

Ame~ican

of the seceded states, but also a finan

oial readjustment. Conditions demanded action, and with nation
al

affai~s

ins.a

preoa~ious

state,

and President spent

Cong~ess

most of the time in battling with one anothert A national debt
of

,~

2,846,000,000,

e~nment,

that

~re

o~

and the taxes

suppo~ting

levied in any civilized

ing to $11.46 in gold
histo~ian

$ 74.28 per capita confronted the gov-

fo~

this debt were the heaviest
in the

oount~y

wo~ld,

amount

l

every inhabitant of the land. The

Muzzey explains the difficulty in secuzing aid by

means of the Amerioan Party system, and shows the absurd condition into whloh the United States political organization has
fallen in past years. He says, " A vote cast aaainst a Republican candidate

fo~

the humblest office ln any village was a

vote cast for treason. Under such conditions lt was impossible
to get any political issue like the tariff, the currency,or
.

the

2

pat~onage

considered purely on its merits". on the other

hand, if Congress had a sufficient
ranks to

ove~~ide

majo~ity

vetoes, then even with a

in the Republican
recaloit~ant P~esi

dent, it still could have passed legislation regarding

finan~

cial

Fo~d

~econst~uction

and aided the

enti~e

nation. James

Rhodes says, " the essential fact was that
1. David MUzzey, The
2. ~·• P• 24.

Ame~ican

Cong~ess gove~ned

Adventure, Vol. II. New York,
1927, P• 23.
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the country and was sustained by publia sentiment at the
North, So far as the policy of reconstruction was concerned,
3

Congress had nearly reduced the President to impotence". Evidently,then, the

~allure

to reconstruct national finanaes

could not be placed upon Johnson's shoulders with any degree
of justice.
Editorials expressed a vigorous demand for something besides a constant battle between the Executive and Congress. Mr
Henzy Raymond, of The New York Times

said,

Congress must

n

at once direct itself to those great vital questions bearing
upon public interests-- retrenchment, taxation, regulation of
4

public burdens and establishment of sound financial principles.
The New York World accused Congress of legislating with Republican ascendancy in mind,and warned that " it remains for
the people of the united States to say whether thay oan afford
to have a country ruined to keep a moribund political party on
5

its legs for four years longer". The National Intelligencer
held no hope for Congressional action regarding financial
matters, and thought " it is already evident and indeed understood that Congress does not seriously intend to touch the
6

financial question during the present session", and aontinued
by reminding people that " while the best interests of the
3.
4.
5.
6.

Rhodes, Vol.
The New York
The New York
The National

VI. P• 71.
Times, January 6, 1868.
World, January 2, 1868.
Intelligencer, January 2, 1868.
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nation

~e

thus wantonly and wickedly negleated, with suffer-

ing in the North and sorrow in the South, millions are wrung
from oppressed taxpayers in order to support

milit~y

despo-

7

tiams".
Opposition to Johnson was not diminished by;.··the absolute
failure of Congress to aacomplish any financial legislation,
and The Chicago Daily Tribune aarried ita program of oppositio
including abolition of privileged classes and freedom of b~8
dened classes, whiah literally meant Republiaan supremaay in
Southern politics. This newspaper accused Johnson of " obsti9

nately, maliciously and aruelly" defeating the will of C<hngres
and

thereby prolonging the military rule over people in South-

ern States. Horace Greeley gave a typical politiaal interpretation from the Republiaan standpoint in the following way:-

" Mr. Johnson's quarrel with Congress was premeditated, and
was impelled by his early determination to break with and
make war upon the Republican party. Mr. Johnson is exerting
all his influence to obstruct and defeat Congressional Recon10
struction". The Boston Transcript appealed to business interests of Ameriaa to beware of suoh a man as Andrew Johnson,who
had shown -imself to be reckless and

unfaithf~

in his polit-

ical life, and argued that after the removal of the President
7. Ibid.

8. me-chicago Daily Tribune, January 20, 1868.

9. Ibid., January I, 1868.
10.~

New York Tribune, January 15, 1868.

" the people will settle down to a season of financial and
mercantile prosperity such as has not been known since Andrew
Johnson determined to subdue Congress and constitute himself
11

as the sole governing power in the Union".

Editorials in The New York World attributed the enormous
expenses of governmental affairs to the Republican policy in
Southern States, and claimed that " a multitude of crippling
taxes could be removed if the lavish waste in holding the
12
South in terror be eliminated". Mr. Henry Raymond's editorial
reflect

several~changes

toward Andrew Johnson during the ae-

oonstruction period, and as election time approached in 1868,
he defended the Republican policy, especially with regard to
the Freedmen's Bureau. On September 8, 1868, an editorial in
The New York Times gave the cost of the Freedmen's Bureau
from January 1, 1865 to August 1, 1868. This total cos; was

$ 6, 377,251. Mr. Raymond declared " this was a mere pittance
to be spent for four million people, yet Democrats argue
13
lavish extravagance"! An interesting statement of the pro-John
son opinion is given in

The National Intelligencer, January 4,

1868. " If the plan of reconstruction proposed by Mr. Lincoln
and adopted by Mr. Johnson had been accepted and carried out
to its natural conclusion, the condition of the country would
11. The Boston Transcript, February 28, 1868.
12. The New York World, January 9, 1868.
13 .The New York Tlmes,September 8, 1868.

-167be one of peace and prosperity. This policy,however, did not
14
suit the aims of political agitators". Then the editor summarized the exact reasons why unnecessary expense was accumulating, by saying," the military satrapies in the
Freedmen's

Burea~

Sout~

the

and the whole army of office-holders and

plunderers fatten at public expense. This political machinery
costs our country one-hundred million dollars per year in
order that the Radical program of Sumner, Stevens and their
15

submissive satellites may be supported".

Horace Greeley declared that " the House and Senate are
doing nobl7, while the President threatens anarchy", and added,
16
" we must reconstruct the South in spite o~ the President".
On the same day Mr. Greeley's statement appeared in The New
York Tribune,(January 4,1868) The New York Times

described the

latest example of Congressional actioa. The chairman of the
Judiciary Committee in the House, Mr. Wilson of Iowa, proposed
a bill which required that two-thirds of the Supreme Court
Justices should declare themselves in favor of a decision made
by the Court before that decision should become binding. Mr.
Raymond thought " the military dictatorship and the late invasion of the Supreme Court have proved to be a sorry fUlfillment of the popular expectation, and the effect is most
14. The National Intelligencer, January 4, 1868.
15. Ibid.,

16. The New York Tribune, January 14, 1868.

17
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disastrous on the country". Furthermore, " the advocates of
the proposed law do not conceal the faot that the object of its
enacjment is to prevent a judgment by the Couzt adverse to the
18

Reconstruction Acts", Although this bill never became a law,
it is a positive indication of the feeling then existing among
the departments of our national government, and shows to what
lengths Congress might go in order to maintain its authority.
Ii is a difficult task for Congressmen to answer certain
queries, and a good example of such is to be found in The National Intelligencer for January,20, 1868. This paper concludes
that " after seven years of unprecedented sway, during which
time the Radical majorities in Congress have controlled and
shaped the whole legislation, the country finds itself on the
19

verge of bankruptcy". According to Mr, Greeley, " our trouble
is not that we have to reconstrucj the South, but also to re20
construct the President". Yet Congress realized that public
opinion must suppprt a final attempt to reconstruct the President which would necessarily mean impeachment, and E.L. Godkin
states quite clearly in The Nation why there was reason for
hesitating in such a move. " It cannot be said that impeachmen
has grown mn favor with the public. In fact, the attitude all
17. The New York Times, January 16, 1868.
18. Ibid., January 23, 1868.
19. The National Intelligencer, January 20, 1868.
20. The lew York Tribune, January 27, 1868.
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21
along has been one of resignation rather than eagerness".

At the beginning of February, 1868, all attention shifted
from finances to the problem of impeachment. There was a notice
able production of undignified language in several leading papers when Johnson was discussed, and a vigorous effort was
quite evidently made to foster impeachment proceedings. In the
opinion of The Chicago Daily Tribune, " the United States owed
its very existence to Stanton and Grant, while to Andrew Johnson

owed nothing but the lesson that our country survives
22
even thosgh a scoundrel be President". Such a conservative
~t

magazine as the Atlantic Monthly stated that " as far back as
the elections of 1866, ·President Johnson proved himself to be
23
a renegade". It is significant to note that the editor added
in this same article that " time and events have, partially
at least, showed that the President was not altogether wrong
24
in looking for a change in popular sentiment". In this statement he referred to Andrew JohnsOn's appeal to the people, and
his hope that public sentimwnt would ultimately save his

polio~

But the policy of Lincoln, Johnson or no other President was
of any value then, and a statement from Harpers Weekly expresses this attitude."A President with a policy is an anomaly lnd
21. The Nation, March 5, 1868.
22. The chicafo Dailt Tribune, February 10, 1868.
23. The I't!an io Honnly, February, 1868.
24. Ibid.

25
an absutdity in our system".
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The New York Times granted that " the Republican party in
Congress seems to be unanimously in favor of impeachment", but
thought " it certainly would be a very extraordinary spectacle
to see Congress pass a law creating an offense, prescrbing a
penalty, and then acting at once as prosecutor,

ju~ge

and jury

26

under this law". Nevertheless, Congress chose to impeach Andre
Johnson before the Tenure-of-Office Act was declared Constitutional by the Supreme Court, and on February 26, 1868, the
House voted that Andrew Johnson, President of the United States
be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors. The sentiment
backr:of such a move is perhaps best shown by the editorials of
Horace Greeley. He said, " We heartily endorse the action of
the House. If the Republican parpy has, or ever had an enemy
preeminently deadly and perfidious, his name is Andrew Johnson.
He must be impeached for the good of the country, and the
27

people will say, 'Amen' "· On February 25, the following statement appeared in The Chicago Daily Tribune. " The American
people impeach you, Andrew Johnson, as the disturber of national peace, the violator of national law, the stumbling block of
28
national justice and the organizer of national ruin".
25. Harpers Weekl~, January 25, 1868.
26. The New Yorklmes, February 25, 1868.
27. The lew York Tribune, February 29, 1863.
28. The chicago Daily Tribune, February 25, 1868.

-lllOpinion was suffiaiently divided to make the outaome uncertain, and this added to the vigor with which many papers
attempted to convert public sentiment. An attempt was made to
exert pressure upon members of the Senate, and The New York
Worlcf severely condemned the practice by saying, "at what former period in the history of this country could it have been
possible for the party press to have made use of threats and
denunciations for the purpose of compelling members of the
Senate to act in obedience to a supposed popular demand. Johnson's removal will proclaim that the Executive office is held
by any incumbent at the party pleasure of that fact~on which
29
controls the legislature". Henry Raymond said, " the entire
press, with one or two exceptions, have treated it only as a
party matter, while Thaddeus Stevens, Ben Butler, Wendell
Phillips, and others of the same stamp evidently believe that
30
the Senate can be made to bend to party necessi tiesn.
James G. Blaine said,

n

In fact, there was but one charge

of any gravity against the President--- that of violating the
Tenure-of-Office Act. But on this charge there was a very grave
difference o! opinion among those equally competent to deaide.
Mr. Fessenden, one' of the ablest lawyers that had sat in the
Senate since

1~.

Webster, believed on his oath and honor-- that

29. The New York World, Hay 11, 1868.
30. The New York Times, March 7, 1868.
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the President had a lawful and Constitutional right to remove
31

Mz. Stanton at this time and in the manner he did". Then, outsi~e

of professional opinion, there was supposed to be a popu-

lar demand for the President's aonviction. Senator Fessenden
gave his official statement regarding such a demand." To the
suggestion that populer opinion demands the conviction of the
President, I reply that he is not now on trial before the
people, but before the Senate.-- The People have not taken an
oath to do impartial Justice according to the
32

and

the law. I have taken that oath".

Const~tution

McCulloch believed that

" it was not an impartial trial", and. when the oath was taken
" it is undeniable that a majority of the Senators were not
33

prepared. to do impartial justice to the accusedn.
If we follow George

w.

Julian's opinion, then 11 the popular

feeling in fav&r of impeachment had now became formidable, and
34

the whole land seemed to be electrified". Julian remarked that
n

the popular feeling against the PresiCI.ent was now rapidly
35

nearing its climax, and becoming a sort of frenzy". Judging
from The Cincinnati Daill Commercial there is certainly no
eviCI.ence

or such a rrenzied feeling, as may be seen in the

31. Blaine, Vol. II. P• 379.
32. Ibid., p. 381.
33. McCulloch, p. 397.
34. Julian, p. 313.
35. Ibid., P• 314.
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following statement; " the impeaehment trial causes very little
excitement. The trial of Andrew Johnson is discovered to be
very much like the trial of anybody else".

This enlightening

bit ot information is added by the same editor-- " There is
reason to believe that about one-half of the Senators would
vote to convict the President without evidence--- simply upon
the speeches of Butler or eloquence of Logan, but there are
as many as ten Senators who will be governed by the testimony
36
of the law". A few days later The Cincinn~ti Daily Commercial
admitted that " it is a matter of serious doubt whether the
impeachment of the President by the House was demanded by the
highest considerations of public policy and the clearest in37
telligence of public duty".
After great pressure had been exerted and every effort made
to convict Johnson, he stood acquitted on May 12, 1868t We
may reasonably suppose that this acquittal was a relief in more
ways than one. First of all, people were reminded that if the
vote would be alose and Benjamin Wade cast the deciding ballot,
38

he would be made President by one vote, and that one , his own.

Secondly, a great number of office-seekers had flocked to Washington expecting a sweeping change following

~a.

Wade's access-

ion to office, and Republicans were quite anxious as to the
36. The Cincinnati Dailt Commercial, April 6, 1868.
37. Ibid., April 13, 18 8.
38. The National Intelli~encer, March 6, 1868.
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effects this might have upon the next Presidential election.
McCulloch says, " it is quite olear to the minds of many men
that nothing would be gained, and great loss might be sustained
39
by a change at that time and in such a manner". The New York
Times said, " What makes Mr. Johnson's impeachment safe and
tran~uil

is the fact that he has no party to sustain him, and

therefore public opinion has become tolerably well settled in
the

We believe that comparatively few hope for ae40
quittal". The New York World remarked at the beginning of the
matte~.

trial that " one of the flagrant enormities which make impeachment a disgrace to the American people and a
assault on the structure of

dange~ous

government is the fact that
41
the Senate is an interested tribunal", and Senator Wilson dethei~

clared " if there were doubts to vex him in the process of
reaching that conolusion,his country would have the benefit of
42
those doubts, rather than the President". With political bias
so evident,tt is little wonder that as the trial proceeded,the
conviction grew that the impeaohwent was " Politics".
Those Senators who dared to vote against the Radicals were
subJected to severe criticism following the acquittal. In the
opinion of !he Boston Transcript, " treachery in the Presidential chair may perhaps be borne for a few months, but when it
39.
40.
41.
42.

McCulloch, p. 401.
The New York Times, April 27, 1868.
The New fork world, March 5, 1868.
Oberholtzer, Vol. II. p. 138.

-115becomes infectious and spreads to the Senate chamber, public
indignation will be aroused to a degree such as has hardly
43
been witnessed since the firing on Fort Sumter". Horace Greele
had already practically his verbal resources prior to the
trial, and when the verdiot was announced, he exclaimed," Welll
Let Messrs. Chase, Fessenden

~1d

Company tale care of their

man Johnson, while we organize for and make certaia the joy44
ful advent of Grant and Victory "• E.L.Godkin thought the whole
affair ought to be dramatized," for it certainly would furnish
the material for what the play-bills call a side-splitting
45
farce".
Following the impeachment trial Andrew Johnson's name

rapid~

ly became poor copy, because he was no longer in the political
arena and public attention was now concentrated on the campaign
of General Grant. Johnson's final message to Congress was practioally disregarded and while he remained in a comparatively
helpless condition,the United States Congress proceeded to
bring the bitter negro suffrage campaign to its final culmination. This came in the enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment,
granting suffrage without respect to color. Meanwhile the Democrats held their National Convention in New York City, where
William Marcy Tweed, Fernande Wood, A. Oakey Hall and the
43. The Boston Transcript, May 1~, 1868.
44. The New York Tribune, May 18 , 1868.
45. The Nation, May 21, 1868.

-ll6Tammany leaders served as the reception committee. With these
names appearing on the political horizon American history
rapidly became what F. L. Paxson termed " The New Nation".

GRITIGAL ESSAY aN AUTHORITIES
This essay includes manuscript source material, reminiscences, general secondary works, biographies and periodicals.
Manuscript Source Material
There are only a few letters available in the McCormick
Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois, but these letters provide a very good source of information concerning private
opinion in the South during this period. The letters included
in this study were taken from the private correspondence of
Judge D. Davidson, Lexington,Virginia.
Periodicals
The two most important weekly periodicals for a study of
this era are Harpers Weekly (New York} and The Nation (New
York). Under the editorial guidance of E.L. Godkin, The Nation
became a periodical for cultured people. Ordinarily, at any
rate, Mr. Godkin was able to see both sides of a question and
his magazine is one of the most important and reliable sources
used in this study. Hr. George William Curtis plaoed Harpers
Weekly on a new plane of development, but his arguments are
far more biased than those of The Nation, and taken as a whole
they must be compared with standard historical writing to be
of use in such a study as this. The Atlantio Monthly(Boston)
offers a wide variety of opinion from business men, politicians, and ministers. The editorials were written by such

leaders as Henry Ward Beecher, Edward E. Hale and others. It
is quite valuable as an indication of public opinion among
leaders in the North.
Newspapers
Information taken from newspaper sources is necessarily
susceptible to politival prejudice and a great deal of sectional bias, therefore whenever possible, two papers have been
selected from the same city or area to give a more balanced
impressioa. The Chicago Times was a typical Northern Democratic paper whose editorials were unusually powerful, witty
and outspoken. The Chicago Daily Tribune was constantly campaigning either for negro suffrage or against Andrew Johnson.
It was probably one of the most powerful organs of public
opinion in the enti*e country and the material it offers is
almost unlimited. The Cincinnati Daily Commercial offers a
good set of editorials apparently free from extreme radicalism
and quite sensibly written, Opinion from Washington D.C. may
be taken from The Washington Chronicle or The National Intelligencer • Colonel John

w.

Forney's Washington Chronicle reflects

the effect of personal feeling between

W~.

Forney and Presi-

dent Johnson and is a very good example of the way one of

Mr.

Johnson's blunders reacted against him through the press. At
the beginning The Chronicle was quite friendly to Johnson and
it never became extremely radical. The National Intelligencer
presents some of the most forceful ideas found anywhere in the

press of America. It consistently supported him to the end and
for the most part the editorials are free from political bias.
New England sentiments are well shown in The Boston Transcript,
which was said to have been under the control of Senator
Charles Sumner. It is typically sectional, decidedly anti-Johnson, and a consistent upholder of Congressional plans and

idea~

New York City naturally offers the widest range of material to
be found in any one city of the country. The greatest of the
New York papers was undoubtedly

Mr.

Henry Raymond's New York

Times. Henry Raymond was one of the outstanding editors of hie
day, a member of Congress, and a man who maintained his ideas
even against the drift of public opinion. The New York Times
is one of the very best of all the papers studied. Horace
Greeley, edi*or of The

~ew

York Tribune, was a unique figure

in the political and editorial field of his day. He opposed
Johnson during the entire comtest, and his opposition is far
too important to be disregarded in a study of the reconstruction period. Andrew Johnson received strong suppprt from

~

New York World, and yet we must regard material from this
paper as somewhat less reliable than that found in

t~.

Ray-

mond's paper. It is biased in favor of Johnson. Of all the
papers for this era The Baltimore Sun is as consistent;
brilliant and exceptional in every way as any to found in
either North or South. It offers some unusually good arguments,
and even though pro-Johnson throughout, it is characterized

by sane, well-balanced editorial writing. The Lexington
Observer and Reporter (Lexington,Kentuoky) went to such extremes from time to time that it was threatened with suppression. It was decidedly Southern in viewpoint, and very open in
its denunciation of Congress. However, editorials are so interesting and well written that there can be n6 doubt as to the
influence this paper exerted. The Connecticut Herald ( New
Haven, Connecticut) was a typical Yankee journal. To this
paper, impeachment was always necessary, and there was little
evidence of any viewpoint other than that of New England.
Material is quite abundant in its editorial columns, and its
value lies in the faot that it gives us a good sectional view.
Biographies
Robert

w.

Winston's biographY of Andrew Johnson,Plebeian

and Patriot, New York,l928, is a good one-volume work to be
used in a study of this kind. There are many ideas found in it
not

~ound

in the ordinary works, and it is well written.
Reminiscences

Carl Schurz' Reminiscences, New York, 1907, Vol. III. is
a rather biased story of events between 1863-1889. This book
cannot be used too exjensively because of Mr. Schurz' political affiliations and activities. George
politician from Indiana, has

wri~ten

w.

Julian, radi•al

a small volume entitled

Personal Recollections, 1840-1872, Chicago, 1884, which is so
highly colored as to be of small historical value except as an
indication of this type of opinion. Our study here has shown
a few of the inconsistent ideas in this book. Hugh McCulloch,
Secretary of the Treasury, was associated with both Lincoln
and Johnson. Along with Gideon Welles, he most assuredly provides the outstanding stery of personal reminiscences for this
time~,

His book, Men and Measures of Half a Century, New York,

1888, does not claim to be in chronological order, but includes
many events just as they came to the author's mind. It must be
remembered that the book was not published until 1888, but
nevertaeless, it is quite reliable. The three-volume Diary of
Gi4eon Welles, New York,l911, is the most exact, chronological
account from the pen of one who was associated with Johnson
from the beginning. It is interesting, fav&rs Johnson, is
quite accurate, and is the most complete of all this period.
General SecQndary Works
James G. Blaine's, Twenty Years of Congress, Norwich Conny
ecticut, 1886, is useful and very suggestive, but also often
inaccurate and strongly partisan. The book by John

w.

Burgess,

Reconstruction and the Constitution, New York, 1907, deals
incisively with the palitical and legal aspects of the period.
William A. Dunning's Reconstruction,Political and
New York,l907, gives a good

anal~sis

~con•mic,

of the principle Consti-

tutional developments of the reconstruction in the South. fwo
standard historical texts have been used in preparing this
atudy; James Ford Rhodes', History of the United States from
the Compromise of 1850, New York, 1906, and Ellis Paxson
Oberholtzer's , A History of the United States since the Civil
~'

New York, 1922. Rhodes is not an admirer of Andrew John-

son, and his book probably favozs the Radicals slightly too
much, while Oberholtzer is favorable to Johnson. The

latte~

stresses periodiaal material, and. his volumes include a more
general view of social and economic problems than those of
Rhodes. Volume

v.

of Woodrow Wilson's History of the American

People, New York, 1961, is a brief but just and well-proportioned account of this period. For a one-volume work on the
Lincoln of reconstruction, none is more complete than that
~itten'by

Charles McCarthy entitled The Lincoln Plan of Re-

construction, New York, 1901.

The !ge of Hate, New York, 1930,

by George Fort Milton, is one of the most exceptional pieces
of writing available for this study. An unusual number of
manuscript sources have been used, and the bibliography is extensive. A more standard type of work is that written by David

s.

Muzzey, The American Adventure, Volume II, New York, 1927.

This is an ideal volume from which to secure economic and
social developments in American history. Frederic L. Paxson's
two books, Recent History of the United States, New York, 1921,

and The New Nation, New York, 1919, may be correlated with
suah a study as this in order to provide a sequence of eTents
and maintain continuity. John Spencer Bassett's A Short History
of the united States, New York, 1921, is the last volume used
in our study, and is probably unsurpassed as a one-volume
history of the United States.
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